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I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent influx of patent pools, research consortia, and similar 
cooperative groups led by companies at the vanguard of American 
innovation has raised a pressing question: How does collective action 
influence the incentive to innovate? This question hinges on how pa-
tent pools are internally governed — a topic that has not been deeply 
examined by legal scholars.
1
 Through an original study of fifty-two 
                                                                                                                  
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. I am grateful to 
Rebecca Eisenberg, Robert Merges, Gideon Parchomovsky, Mark Janis, Marshall Leaffer, 
and Liza Vertinsky for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I also wish to 
thank participants of the 12th Annual Intellectual Property Scholars Conference and partici-
pants of the 3rd Annual Patent Conference. Finally, this Article owes a debt to the resource-
ful librarians of the National Archives and Research Administration, the Wisconsin 
Historical Society, and the New York State Library. 
1. For the most detailed empirical examinations of patent licensing collectives to date, 
see generally FLOYD L. VAUGHAN, ECONOMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM (1925) (containing 
short accounts of many patent pools that were the subject of antitrust litigation in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries); FLOYD L. VAUGHAN, THE UNITED STATES 
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private agreements, this Article pulls back the veil on patent licensing 
collectives to examine whether such organizations are designed to 
encourage long-term innovation. 
This study is prompted by a widely perceived crisis in our patent 
system.
2
 Today, mosaics of thousands of patents held by many differ-
ent owners are believed to cover the technologies that fuel our econ-
omy — e.g., pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and software.
3
 In this 
age of dispersed entitlements, “downstream” technology users are 
burdened with the high costs of identifying, evaluating, and negotiat-
ing licenses for multitudes of “upstream” patent rights.
4
 Moreover, 
patent holders who learn that their cooperation is essential to a licen-
                                                                                                                  
PATENT SYSTEM (1956) (expanding on Vaughan’s 1925 book with new accounts of patent 
pools, including a large number that formed during the 1930s). In a 2007 publication, Josh 
Lerner, Marcin Strojwas, and Jean Tirole examined aspects of these collectives unrelated to 
internal governance. See generally Josh Lerner et al., The Design of Patent Pools: The De-
terminants of Licensing Rules, 38 RAND J. ECON. 610 (2007) (examining grant-back provi-
sions and independent licensing in patent pools). Studies of more recent patent licensing 
organizations also do not focus on internal governance or collective choice arrangements. 
See, e.g., Anne Layne-Farrar & Josh Lerner, To Join or Not To Join: Examining Patent Pool 
Participation and Rent Sharing Rules, 29 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 294, 296–97, 300–02 (2011) 
(exploring whether fixed rent-sharing rules influence participation rates in contemporary 
technological standard-setting patent pools). 
2. The challenges that face our patent system and the threats that those challenges pose 
for innovation, economic prosperity, and social welfare are dominant themes of contempo-
rary books and academic articles on patent law. See generally, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & 
MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT 
INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008) (arguing that the patent system is resulting in a net loss in 
social welfare, in part because patent rights are excessively distributed among multiple 
patent holders); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS, AND HOW COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT (2009) (identifying numerous causes behind this perceived “crisis” and chart-
ing a new way forward); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND 
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004) (arguing that the patent system creates 
waste and uncertainty, thereby hindering innovation). 
3. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698–700 (1998) (discussing the trans-
action costs imposed by diversely held and complementary upstream patent rights); Michael 
Mattioli, Communities of Innovation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 103, 110–13 (2012) (describing 
the problem of “patent gridlock” across industries). 
4. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 2, at 76 (describing how the possibility of holdouts 
can inhibit investments in research and development); Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, 
Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1160 (2009) (presenting an 
economic analysis of the patent holdout problem); Mattioli, supra note 3, at 114 (likening 
the holdout problem to the phenomenon of “nail houses,” held by holdout homeowners who 
are stubborn as nails, that dot China’s burgeoning metropolises and slow real estate devel-
opment). 
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see can strategically hold out for prohibitively high royalties.
5
 Experts 
believe that such costs and risks will leave innovation to languish.6 
A long-debated solution to this problem is compulsory licens-
ing — or, in the parlance of Entitlements Theory, a shift from “prop-
erty rules” to “liability rules.”
7
 In contrast to our current patent 
system, which permits patent holders to seek injunctions against in-
fringers, a compulsory licensing regime would require patents to be 
licensed at rates set by an organ of the state, such as a court or Con-
gress.
8
 This solution would remove the need for licensees to bargain 
over patent rights.
9
 Consequently, transaction costs and associated 
risks of holdouts would significantly drop.
10
 However, critics of com-
pulsory licensing believe that government authorities tasked with set-
ting royalty rates would under-compensate innovators.
11
 This, in turn, 
would discourage prospective inventors from investing time and mon-
ey in research and development activities, leading to a drag on inno-
vation. If so, while patent holders may have too much control over the 
fees they collect under the current regime, they would have too little 
control over these fees in a compulsory licensing regime.
12
 
                                                                                                                  
5. See Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. 
CORP. L. 1151, 1160–74 (2008) (describing the holdup or holdout phenomenon in economic 
terms); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 124–26 (Adam B. 
Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the patent holdout problem). 
6. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 699 (“A proliferation of patents on individual 
fragments held by different owners seems inevitably to require costly future transactions to 
bundle licenses together before a firm can have an effective right to develop [future com-
mercial products].”). 
7. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–07 (1972) (presenting a 
new view of legal ordering in which entitlements are governed by either “property rules” or 
“liability rules”); see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 3–6 (2002) (adding to the existing entitlements framework by presenting 
new hybrid approaches that incorporate aspects of property rules and liability rules). 
8. See Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrust: The Role of 
Compulsory Licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 977, 1001–02 (1977) (explaining how a compul-
sory licensing system would work); Richard A. Epstein & F. Scott Kieff, Questioning the 
Frequency and Wisdom of Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents, 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 71, 80–83 (2011) (exploring the possible effect that compulsory licensing could have 
in the pharmaceutical industry); Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the Unit-
ed States: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 8 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 666, 668–74, 683–85 
(1988) (advocating a compulsory patent licensing system).  
9. See Mark A. Lemley, Contracting Around Liability Rules, 100 CAL. L. REV. 463, 475 
(2012) (arguing that inefficient liability rules can and do actually encourage private bargain-
ing). 
10. See generally id. 
11. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property 
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1299 (1996). 
12. See id. at 1304 (“[A] liability rule places a ceiling on the value of the entitlement, 
which can conceivably have devastating incentive effects.”); see also id. at 1307–08 (dis-
cussing fundamental problems with legislative valuation of intellectual property rights). 
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In a landmark 1996 article, Robert Merges suggested that private 
collective action can resolve this problem.13 Merges posited that pri-
vate licensing groups such as patent pools occupy a middle ground 
between property regimes and liability regimes.14 In this middle 
ground, groups of patent holders enter into private agreements in 
which they receive the ability to influence (albeit in a limited way) the 
royalties their inventions command.
15
 This is achieved, Merges ar-
gued, through collective valuation procedures — e.g., negotiating or 
voting over decisions that affect royalty sharing.
16
 
Support for the foregoing theory, referred to herein as the Theory 
of Collective Patent Valuation, is suggested by a wealth of scholarly 
literature on collective valuation regimes in non-patent contexts. The 
Nobelist Elinor Ostrom, for example, documented communities 
around the globe that manage scarce natural resources through collec-
tive valuation procedures, such as democratic voting.
17
 In the United 
States, law and economics scholars have observed similar collective 
property valuation systems at work in private condominium and 
neighborhood associations.
18
 Land owners in the arid American West 
also rely on collective valuation to apportion access to water.
19
 Exam-
ples like these lend support to the tantalizing possibility that patent 
holders can form enduring institutions that grant their members great-
er control over pricing than a compulsory licensing regime would.20 
If this hopeful theory is accurate, the policy implications would 
be significant: By granting their members control over pricing, such 
groups could overcome the risk of under-compensation that exists in 
compulsory licensing proposals. Such groups would also reduce 
transaction costs and holdout risks by aggregating complementary 
patent rights. If patent pools are indeed governed this way, policy-
makers and the interested public might be able to rely on the market to 
solve its own problems.21 As patent licensing collectives form in im-
                                                                                                                  
13. See id. at 1295–97. 
14. See id. at 1294–95. 
15. See id. at 1327–28. 
16. See id. 
17. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
18. See Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 
1512–20 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill, Direct Voting by Property Owners, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 
275, 287–99 (2010). 
19. See Stephen N. Bretsen, Water Markets as a Tragedy of the Anticommons, 33 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 723, 760–82 (2009). 
20. Merges himself noted the use of private voting to manage royalty sharing in a per-
forming rights society and, notably, in a 1917 aircraft patent pool. Merges, supra note 11, at 
1329–40, 1344–47. 
21. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select Inno-
vation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 387–88, 390–91 (2009) (presenting a formal theory that 
patent holders purposefully share their assets under certain circumstances to facilitate col-
lective innovation and dynamic efficiency). 
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portant industries, the internal governance of these organizations is 
not only of academic interest, but also of immediate practical concern. 
In search of answers, this Article explores the realities of collec-
tive governance in patent pools. This study draws on collective patent 
license agreements spanning the years 1856 to 2013 and obtained 
from congressional records, regional repositories of the national ar-
chives, Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests directed to the 
Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”), the Wisconsin State Historical Society, the New York State 
Library in Albany, and in several instances, directly from patent li-
censing organizations.
22
 These contracts document nearly two centu-
ries of scientific and industrial progress, from nineteenth century 
steelmaking to modern-day genetic research, and they describe in viv-
id detail the degree to which members of patent pools can influence 
their compensation.
23
 
Because some patent pools may have gone undocumented, and 
because many of the records that do exist stem from lawsuits and 
congressional hearings, there is a potential for sampling bias. In light 
of the paucity of empirical research on this subject, however, this Ar-
ticle significantly advances what is known about the degree of control 
over pricing that these groups afford to would-be inventors. Moreo-
ver, any sampling bias that does exist could just as easily downplay as 
exaggerate this Article’s chief findings. 
The discussion unfolds in three parts: Part II explains the pricing 
problem that afflicts our patent system and the theory that patent pools 
address this problem through collective patent valuation. Part III pre-
sents an original study of collective agreements that reveals gaps be-
tween theory and practice. Part IV discusses the normative results of 
this study and presents a proposal to mandate the recording of collec-
tive patent agreements with a federal agency. A brief conclusion fol-
lows. 
II. THE PROMISE OF COOPERATION 
Leading commentators believe that our patent system, by bestow-
ing monopoly pricing power on patent holders, generates transaction 
costs that discourage innovation.24 However, if licensing rates were 
                                                                                                                  
22. Identifying, gathering, and reviewing these documents involved judicial, congres-
sional, historical, and news database searches, and correspondence with historians and ar-
chivists. Where agreements were unavailable, this study relied on detailed descriptions of 
agreements provided in court decisions. Stewart Macaulay’s landmark 1963 “gap study” of 
non-contractual relations in business heavily inspired this Article’s methodology. See gen-
erally Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 
AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963). 
23. See infra Appendix. 
24. See supra note 6. 
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set by courts, Congress, or regulators, innovators would perceive a 
risk of under-compensation — a result that would likely reduce inno-
vation investments below optimal levels.
25
 Academics, industry par-
ticipants, and policymakers have long and ineffectively sought to 
resolve this tension through government reforms.
26
 Theory, and pos-
sibly empirical evidence, points toward an elegant solution: private 
collective licensing institutions.
27
  
 A. The Defect of Bargaining Regimes 
Since Thomas Jefferson and James Madison famously debated 
whether their new republic should grant patents, American progress 
has been deeply tied to the “nuisance[]” (Madison’s term) of monopo-
lies.
28
 To illustrate this relationship, scholars often say that patents 
signify a bargain between our society and its geniuses: In exchange 
for new and useful innovations, our patent system permits inventors to 
dictate the prices that consumers and licensees must pay.
29
 This fictive 
bargain was struck in the Patent Act of 1790, and it endures today.
30
 
However, our understanding of how far the “nuisance” of patent pric-
ing should reach has evolved. 
Economic theorists have long viewed our patent system as a 
trade-off between static and dynamic efficiencies.31 As instruments of 
exclusivity, patents spur supra-competitive pricing and sub-
competitive levels of production.
32
 Consequently, some consumers 
                                                                                                                  
25. Compare Merges, supra note 11, at 1307 (arguing that a compulsory patent licensing 
regime would lead to under-compensation), with Lemley, supra note 9, at 475 (arguing that 
non-optimal compulsory licensing rates can actually spur efficient bargaining). 
26. See generally BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 2. 
27. See Merges, supra note 11, at 1327–54 (articulating the theory that intellectual prop-
erty owners can and often do enter into private “liability regimes” to overcome bargaining 
problems). 
28. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in THE WRITINGS 
OF JAMES MADISON: 1790–1802, 274 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) (“With regard to Monopo-
lies, they are justly classed among the greatest nuisances in Government. But is it clear that 
as encouragements to literary works and ingenious discoveries, they are not too valuable to 
be wholly renounced?”). 
29. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 41 (“This is the tradeoff at the heart of 
the patent system. We grant monopolies . . . allow[ing] some holders of patent monopolies 
to earn ‘obscene’ profits . . . because the prospect of those obscene profits is what drives 
firms to develop new products and processes . . . .”). 
30. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–12 (Apr. 10, 1790) (current version at 35 
U.S.C.A. § 101 (2012)). 
31. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
207, 213–14 (2011) (discussing this view in the context of the historical development of 
patent scholarship). 
32. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balanc-
ing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
173, 177–78 (“[S]tandard economic theory predicts that a profit-maximizing producer with 
monopoly power will charge more and produce less than a producer in a competitive mar-
ket . . . .”). 
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who would have been willing to pay competitive prices for patented 
products are unable to obtain them.33 Economists view these aban-
doned transactions as a social deadweight loss that decreases short-
term economic efficiency.
34
 However, an ideal patent regime would 
allow these short-term losses to be outweighed by the long-term dy-
namic gains that innovation can yield.
35
 Viewing patents in these 
terms, early intellectual property scholars sought policies that would 
maximize incentives to innovate and minimize lost transactions.
36
 
As technology has evolved, so too have scholarly views on the 
full costs of our patent system.37 The earliest patents granted by the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) described com-
plete products.
38
 Today, by contrast, the technologies that fuel our 
economy, such as software and drugs, owe their provenance to hun-
dreds and sometimes thousands of existing inventions that have been 
patented by different inventors.
39
 Innovation in the twenty-first centu-
ry unfolds before a vast mosaic of pre-existing devices, manufacturing 
processes, applied algorithms, and scientific research methods. Ours is 
an age of dispersed entitlements. 
In a landmark 1998 article published in Science, Michael Heller 
and Rebecca Eisenberg predicted that the increasing diffusion of tech-
nology ownership would threaten long-term innovation.
40
 The authors 
posited that, prior to investing time and money into any avenue of 
research, would-be innovators would seek to avoid infringing “up-
stream” patented research tools and methods.
41
 This would entail sev-
eral costly and uncertain steps: identifying all patents of possible 
relevance to a project, evaluating the scope and quality of those pa-
tents, and, finally, negotiating licenses with individual patent own-
                                                                                                                  
33. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Mattioli, supra note 31, at 214. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 211. 
36. Id. at 214. 
37. Compare Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. 
& Econ. 265, 265 (1977) (describing the benefits of the patent system for subsequent inno-
vation), with JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2 (describing ways in which the patent system 
might sometimes impede innovation). 
38. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 9884X (issued July 2, 1836) (describing a new type of door 
lock invented by J. McClory); U.S. Patent No. 9430X (issued Feb. 25, 1836) (describing an 
improvement in firearms invented by Samuel Colt); U.S. Patent No. 72X (issued Oct. 14, 
1794) (describing a cotton gin invented by Eli Whitney). The filing dates of these patents 
are unknown due to the 1836 Patent Office fire. 
39. See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 
VA. L. REV. 1857, 1868 (2003) (“Cumulative innovation is the hallmark of high-tech indus-
tries such as computer software, semiconductors, molecular biology, and pharmacology.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
40. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 699. Heller and Eisenberg’s predictions are root-
ed in longstanding economic principles. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (describing transaction costs — e.g., the costs of identifying 
and negotiating with willing buyers and sellers — as an unavoidable reality of commerce). 
41. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 698. 
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ers.
42
 In addition to these transaction costs, there is the risk that indi-
vidual patent holders will strategically hold out for prohibitively high 
fees during negotiations.
43
 Heller and Eisenberg reasoned that the in-
novators who believed that these costs and risks would be too great 
would abandon their research plans altogether — a result they fa-
mously termed “the tragedy of the anticommons.”
44
 
The related risk of holdouts is a second source of costs in the pa-
tent system.
45
 The problem arises when a single buyer must purchase 
assets — e.g., land, patents, etc. — from numerous monopolists. Each 
monopolist who learns that her cooperation is essential to the buyer’s 
plan strategically demands an exorbitant fee. This surplus fee (which 
is distinct from the supra-competitive prices that naturally arise in a 
monopoly setting) could reach as high as the total value of the buyer’s 
project.46 What results is a no-win situation: With each new agree-
ment that is formed, the buyer becomes more committed to complet-
ing the entire project, and the remaining sellers become emboldened 
to hold out for ever higher fees.
47
 Because buyers cannot pay a surplus 
to each seller who demands it, projects subject to holdout pricing tend 
to collapse.
48
 
Anticommons theory inspired a shift in scholarly focus away 
from the short-term costs of patents and toward the impact of patents 
on long-term innovation. Although foregone innovations cannot be 
empirically studied, patent bargaining failures have been well-
documented by intellectual property commentators.
49
 For instance, in 
the realm of genetic research, Stephen Maurer described a patent ex-
change initiative that halted at a licensing impasse after years of nego-
                                                                                                                  
42. JANET HOPE, BIOBAZAAR: THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 
44 (2008) (“Where there are multiple patents in a given field, the cost of identifying which 
ones are relevant to a particular avenue of research may itself be prohibitive.”). 
43. See, e.g., supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining the holdout problem). 
44. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998). The proverbial “tragedy of the com-
mons” is a problem well known to academics in many fields: When the rights to use a re-
source are excessively divided, users will tend to deplete the resource. Garrett Hardin, The 
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968). The tragedy of the anticommons 
arises, by contrast, when rights to exclude others from using a resource are excessively 
divided. This problem leads to underuse of the resource. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 3 at 
698 (“[A] resource is prone to underuse . . . when multiple owners each have a right to 
exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of use.”). 
Viewed in this way, both problems can be understood as symmetrical consequences of 
excessive fragmentation of ownership rights. 
45. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining the holdout problem). 
46. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Hidden Function of Takings Com-
pensation, 96 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1685–86 (2010). 
47. See id. at 1685; Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Sequential Bargaining and 
Land Assembly: A New Theory of the Holdout Problem, 14 AM. L. ECON. REV. 372, 373 
(2012) (“[A]s the buyer becomes more committed to the project, sellers are able to extract a 
larger share of the surplus . . . .”). 
48. See Heller & Hills, supra note 18 at 1473. 
49. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 11, at 1354 (1996). 
No. 2] Power and Governance in Patent Pools 429 
 
tiation and planning.
50
 Rebecca Eisenberg documented similar prob-
lems during her tenure as chair of the National Institutes of Health 
Working Group on Research Tools:
51
 In a 2001 publication, she re-
ported that significant administrative problems involved with conduct-
ing patent licensing negotiations delayed and impeded research.
52
 
Today, some commentators debate the extent of the anticommons 
problem in various industries, but few dispute that the problem ex-
ists.
53
 
Experts believe that the courts, the PTO, and Congress are re-
sponsible for creating this problem.
54
 Commentators have criticized 
the Federal Circuit, for instance, for encouraging excessive patent 
filings by relaxing subject matter restrictions in areas such as business 
methods and human genes.
55
 Critics have also faulted the PTO’s pa-
tent-friendly policies for contributing to a flood of patent filings.56 
Congress has been lambasted as well for enacting legislation such as 
the Bayh-Dole Act,
57
 which opened the door to a surge of new patent 
filings on the products of federally-funded research.58 Critics believe 
that these policies have encouraged researchers to seek patent protec-
tion for basic tools and methods that, in an earlier age, would have 
been freely available.
59
 
                                                                                                                  
50. See Stephen M. Maurer, Inside the Anticommons: Academic Scientists’ Struggle To 
Build a Commercially Self-Supporting Human Mutations Database, 1999–2001, 35 RES. 
POL’Y 839, 840 (2006). 
51. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining over the Transfer of Proprietary Research 
Tools: Is This Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 223, 225 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001). 
52. See id. 
53. But see, e.g., Chester J. Shiu, Of Mice and Men: Why an Anticommons Has Not 
Emerged in the Biotechnological Realm, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 413, 415–16 (2009) 
(challenging the existence of an anticommons in the realm of biotechnology). 
54. See Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 276–79 (2011). 
55. See Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure To Expand 
Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 420–28 (2011). Compare State St. Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373–75 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (introducing 
the “useful, concrete and tangible result” test for patentable subject matter), with In re Bil-
ski, 545 F.3d 943, 959–60 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (replacing the “useful, concrete and tangible 
result” test with the “machine-or-transformation” test), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 
U.S. 593 (2010) (holding that the “machine-or-transformation” test is not the “sole test” for 
deciding patent eligibility).  
56. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 11–17 (citing these changes within the PTO as 
the cause of an “explosion” of patent rights). One widely cited study estimated that the PTO 
granted eighty-five percent of all applications between 1993 and 1998. Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., 
Ogden H. Webster & Richard Eichmann, Continuing Patent Applications and Performance 
of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office — Extended, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 35, 38 (2002). 
57. See Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96–517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019–28 (codified as amend-
ed at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–11, 301–307 (2012)). 
58. See Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share Alike: Increasing Access to Government-
Funded Inventions Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 393, 410–11 
(2006). 
59. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 115–19 (“Following the CAFC [State 
Street] decision . . . the number of business method patent applications has exploded . . . .”). 
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The belief that our government’s institutions hinder innovation 
rather than encourage it has inspired a wave of reform proposals, 
some of which were included in the Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act of 2011, that are designed to tailor the initial apportionment of 
patent rights.
60
 Many such solutions would make patents harder to 
obtain by, for instance, increasing application fees, fortifying the 
standard for obviousness, and increasing the quality of PTO review.
61
 
Even bolder suggestions abound, which include placing a hard limit 
on the total number of patents issued each year and offering new 
kinds of patents that can be asserted only against certain types of in-
fringers.62 
It is doubtful that any of these approaches to tailor the govern-
ment’s apportionment of patent rights will remedy the proverbial anti-
commons. The reason is simple: The transaction costs and holdout 
risks that fuel the anticommons problem could persist in a world with 
fewer patents. For example, in an industry where each of four firms 
holds at least one essential patent, prospective competitors must nego-
tiate with all four firms. And, regardless of the number of patents that 
each owns, any of these firms could still decide to hold out and there-
by cause an entire project to collapse.
63
 Ultimately, the true “nui-
sance” of patent pricing lies not in the number of patents in a 
particular industry but in the number of patent holders with whom 
potential licensees must bargain.
64
  
 B. The Defect of Liability Regimes 
Some experts believe that the defects of bargaining over patent li-
censes could be avoided if the government, rather than patent holders, 
were to set patent licensing fees.
65
 This solution is rooted in Guido 
                                                                                                                  
60. For instance, the America Invents Act encourages third parties to submit prior art that 
could potentially lead to a rejection of a patent application under consideration by the PTO. 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 8 (2012). 
61. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 184 (discussing the use of post-grant 
reexaminations in eliminating bad patents); Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent 
Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687, 688 (2010) (arguing that higher ex ante costs dis-
courage the submission of low-value patent applications). 
62. See Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
863, 881–93 (2007) (proposing a new patent system that would contain a limited number of 
tradable patent rights); Parchomovsky & Mattioli, supra note 31, at 223–24 (proposing a 
new kind of patent right dubbed “quasi-patent” that could be asserted only against business 
competitors). 
63. Cf. Heller & Hills, supra note 18, at 1473 (explaining the holdout problem and con-
cluding that “[w]ith several such holdouts, negotiations collapse because the assembler, of 
course, cannot pay the entire surplus to each owner”). 
64. Cf. id. 
65. See, e.g., Fauver, supra note 8, at 667–68; Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts 
over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union: An 
Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 
1679 (2001). The notion of compulsory patent licensing has long been a topic of debate in 
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Calabresi and Douglas Melamed’s classic article, Property Rules, Li-
ability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral.
66
 
Likening the law to a grand cathedral that can be portrayed from 
many perspectives, Calabresi and Melamed presented a new vision of 
legal ordering that united two seemingly disparate concepts — liabil-
ity and property — under the common rubric of “entitlements.”
67
 A 
property entitlement roadblock, the authors explained, can be re-
moved by paying off the entitlement holder.
68
 For example, a home-
owner’s entitlement to exclude trespassers can be overcome if the 
would-be trespasser buys the house. By contrast, liability entitlements 
are extinguished through the payment of fees determined ex post by 
some organ of the state.69 For instance, a tortfeasor who causes a car 
accident can eliminate his victim’s entitlement to compensation by 
paying court-ordered damages.
 
 
Calabresi and Melamed proposed that lawmakers could enhance 
the level of economic efficiency in society by wisely selecting enti-
tlements.
70
 To illustrate this idea, the authors conjured a simple anti-
commons scenario: a real estate developer seeking to develop one 
thousand adjacent parcels of land into a park that he hopes to sell to a 
city.
71
 If the developer is willing and able to pay every landowner an 
above-market price, in principle the park should be built.
72
 In practice, 
the project will fail because individual landowners can hold out for 
excessive prices.
73
 Calabresi and Melamed explained that this ineffi-
cient result could have been avoided if a court, rather than the land-
owners, had the power to set prices — i.e., if the land were governed 
by liability rules instead of property rules.74 This example supports the 
authors’ normative argument that liability rules are preferable when 
property entitlements cannot be effectively bargained for — precisely 
the conditions believed to fuel the patent anticommons.
75
 
                                                                                                                  
the United States. See, e.g., Frank I. Schechter, Would Compulsory Licensing of Patents Be 
Unconstitutional?, 22 VA. L. REV. 287, 288–91 (1936) (referring to debates about compul-
sory licensing that occurred as early as 1912). 
66. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1090–92. 
67. Id. at 1089. 
68. Id. at 1092. 
69. Id. 
70. See id. at 1093–94 (arguing for “the set of entitlements which would lead to that allo-
cation of resources which could not be improved in the sense that a further change would 
not so improve the condition of those who gained by it that they could compensate those 
who lost from it and still be better off”). 
71. See id. at 1106–07. 
72. See id. This result is consistent with frictionless Coasian bargaining. Cf. Coase, supra 
note 40, at 6. 
73. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1106–07. 
74. Id. 
75. See id. (“Whenever this is the case an argument can readily be made for moving from 
a property rule to a liability rule.”); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 699–700 (explain-
ing conditions expected to give rise to an anticommons in the biomedical research context). 
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Although Calabresi and Melamed’s The Cathedral has had a pro-
found and lasting influence on intellectual property scholarship, sub-
sequent scholarship has tended to advocate only a partial shift to 
compulsory patent licensing.
76
 The chief concern is that government 
institutions could harm innovation incentives by under-compensating 
patent holders.
77
 To appreciate this concern, one might consider how 
courts value entitlements in a paradigmatic liability setting: contract 
breaches. As every first-year law student learns, the standard award in 
contract disputes is expectation damages — an amount that places 
non-breaching parties where they would have been had the breach 
never occurred.78 When expectation damages cannot be calculated, 
courts sometimes award reliance damages — a remedy that restores 
non-breaching parties to the economic position they were in before 
the contract was formed.
79
 Courts determine these amounts by exam-
ining evidence produced by litigants and sometimes by considering 
industry information such as standard market prices.
80
 
                                                                                                                  
76. Leading commentators have used The Cathedral as a launching point for proposing 
new hybrid property/liability rules. For instance, in 1977 Martin J. Adelman proposed a new 
liability rule that would require all patent holders to offer licenses at terms at least as good 
as the worst terms offered to the first two licensees. See Adelman, supra note 8, at 999–
1000 (proposing the “one license rule”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Writing on the 
subject of trade secrets in 1994, J.H. Reichman proposed a set of liability rules to govern the 
pricing of technical know-how. J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and 
Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2548 (1994). In 2002, Abraham Bell and 
Gideon Parchomovsky proposed an ingenious new patent entitlement regime that combined 
elements of property rules and liability rules — a hybrid they dubbed “pliability rules.” Bell 
& Parchomovsky, supra note 7, at 25–28. 
77. See Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and 
the Reality, 33 IDEA 349, 357 (1993) (“Anything that will interfere with the exclusive right 
of the owner of the patent to work it, will certainly discourage investment in this type of 
enterprise because of the consequent reduction in the possibility of commercial success.”) 
(citation omitted); Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: 
The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 99 (1994) (“The primary argument 
against compulsory licensing is that it allows courts, not the parties themselves, to set the 
terms of exchange.”); Carol M. Nielsen & Michael R. Samardzija, Compulsory Patent Li-
censing: Is It a Viable Solution in the United States?, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 509, 535 (2007) (“Our courts should not be converted into a regulatory body, setting 
prices, licensing terms, and other industry requirements.”). 
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. a (2013) (defining the ex-
pectation interest); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 730–31, 757–58 (4th ed. 2004) 
(explaining that the expectation interest is the ordinary basis for awards in contract dis-
putes). 
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 (2013) (defining reliance damag-
es); FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, at 732–33, 757–58 (explaining that an injured party’s 
reliance interest often serves as an alternate basis for contract awards). 
80. Contract law disfavors property-like rules. For instance, injunctions and specific per-
formance are only imposed with limitations. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, at 742–57 
(explaining numerous limitations to the imposition of injunctions and specific performance 
as remedies in contracts disputes). Likewise, courts generally do not enforce ex ante “bar-
gains” for the price of breach in the form of penalty clauses. Id. at 811 (explaining that 
stipulated damages are permissible when they reflect liquidated damages, but not when they 
serve as a penalty for breach). 
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It is easy to appreciate why valuing patents could be a far more 
complex and speculative endeavor than determining contract damag-
es. Like contract remedies, optimal patent royalties would match the 
outcome of hypothetical market exchanges — i.e., entitlement hold-
ers’ expectations.
81
 If courts systematically awarded less than this 
value, innovation incentives would decrease.82 However, unlike par-
ties to a contract, patent applicants rarely hold well-defined expecta-
tion interests, making it difficult for a court to objectively gauge the 
royalties that a patent would have commanded in a voluntary ex-
change.
83
 
Another reason that compulsory licensing is more difficult than 
contracting relates to changes in the market for the patented technolo-
                                                                                                                  
81. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 271 (2009) 
(“[T]he owner of [an] intellectual creation would prefer to be allowed to refuse to license 
her creation unless the licensee agrees to pay the fee she requests.”). 
82. See Compulsory Licensing of Patents: Hearing on H.R. 9259, H.R. 9815, and H.R. 
1666 Before the Subcomm. on Compulsory Licensing of the H. Comm. on Patents, 75th 
Cong. 38 (1938) (“[M]en do not go into the development of new things for an ordinary 
competitive profit. They have got to see a speculative profit in it or they will not go into it.”) 
(statement of Thomas Ewing, former Commissioner of Patents); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, 
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 
YALE L.J. 1027, 1037–38 n.40 (1995) (“Systematic under-compensation for entitlement 
holders under a liability rule regime would undermine the entitlement holders’ incentive to 
create or develop the entitlement.”); Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The 
Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2093 (1997) (“The risk of undercom-
pensation in such situations is pervasive given the inability to determine with accuracy the 
losses, both economic and subjective, that follow when individuals find that someone else 
has plucked away from them assets that they need for the operation of their own business.”); 
Julian-Arnold, supra note 77, at 357 (“Absent sufficient protection, creators can no longer 
recover the cost of their investment in research and development, resulting in lower produc-
tion, fewer trading opportunities and higher costs to the consumer.”). 
83. In recognition of this problem, some courts have required a high standard of proof to 
award lost profits in patent disputes. See Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 
348–49 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (requiring the injured party to prove its lost profits by the “strictest 
proof” and to prove by “clear and convincing evidence” facts relevant to the inquiry). But 
see Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 113 F.3d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Thus, the 
standard in private actions is that the patentee must establish, by a preponderance of evi-
dence, that but for the infringement he would have earned the profits he asserts were lost.”) 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Basing patent royalties on research 
and development costs as an alternative measure of compensation is also problematic. Pa-
tents are designed to empower inventors to charge the maximum that licensees are willing to 
spend, rather than the cost of research and development alone. See Adelman, supra note 8, 
at 1007 (explaining that theoretically a patentee can “engage in perfect price discrimination 
by charging each customer the maximum amount that particular customer would be willing 
to pay”); see also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire Co., 95 F.2d 978, 
984 (6th Cir. 1937) (defining a reasonable royalty in a patent infringement suit as an amount 
which a prospective licensee would be “willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make 
and sell the patented article, in the market, at a reasonable profit”) (citing Rockwood v. Gen. 
Fire Extinguisher Co., 37 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1930)). For this reason, awarding costs alone 
would under-compensate innovators. Moreover, there are practical difficulties in determin-
ing the “cost” of obtaining a patent. As Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have 
observed, patent licenses “reflect not only the expected profits of the patentee on the current 
innovation, but also the expenditures incurred by the patentees in research projects that 
failed to yield a patentable result.” Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 7, at 71–72. 
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gy. Unlike market participants, courts or Congress could not easily 
adjust patent royalties over time. A chief benefit of patent ownership 
is the freedom to raise or lower prices in response to changes in de-
mand and cost. For instance, if a patented genetic research method 
became valuable ten years after the patent’s issue date, the patent’s 
owner could recoup her initial investment by demanding higher royal-
ties.
84
 Because it would not be feasible for government institutions to 
replicate this dynamism, compulsory patent licensing necessarily de-
nies inventors their full monopoly return. 
Empirical evidence supports the argument that inventors would 
be under-compensated in a compulsory licensing regime: In practice, 
courts often under-compensate patent holders for damages caused by 
past infringement.
85
 Experiments designed to evaluate compulsory 
patent licensing have concluded “that although a scheme including 
compulsory licensing and rate regulation would lower some prices, it 
would also result in less market security, significantly less research in 
some fields, less public disclosure and transfer of technology, and 
increased administrative costs.”
86
 
In sum, both bargaining and liability regimes engender pricing 
problems that hinder innovation. In our current bargaining regime, 
innovation is hindered by high transaction costs and the risk of hold-
outs due to the near-absolute power that patent holders have to set 
                                                                                                                  
84. See Adelman, supra note 8, at 999 (“It may be quite appropriate for the patentee to 
obtain a higher royalty from the second patentee owing, for example, to changes in demand 
and cost conditions since the first license was granted or to a desire to capture the benefits of 
one licensee’s more efficient production methods.”). 
85. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (1978) 
(“The setting of a reasonable royalty after infringement cannot be treated . . . as the equiva-
lent of ordinary royalty negotiations among truly ‘willing’ patent owners and licensees. That 
view would . . . make an election to infringe a handy means for competitors to impose a 
‘compulsory license’ . . . .”); see also Fauver, supra note 8, at 667 n.9 (“When a government 
grants a compulsory license, the courts will ordinarily prescribe a royalty rate which would 
be less favorable to the patentee.”). 
86. See Adelman, supra note 8, at 986 n.35 (citing CHRISTOPHER THOMAS TAYLOR & Z. 
SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 349–50 (1973)). It should be 
noted, however, that compulsory patent licensing may be helpful in settings unrelated to 
anticommons problems. See generally Fauver, supra note 8, at 685 (arguing in favor of a 
compulsory patent licensing plan). In 1982, the economist Pankaj Tandon proposed that 
compulsory patent licensing could enhance social welfare in some settings, although he 
noted that this conclusion relied upon simplified assumptions. Pankaj Tandon, Optimal 
Patents with Compulsory Licensing, 90 J. POL. ECON. 470, 483–84 (1982). Cf. Merges, 
supra note 77, at 99 (“Although Scherer has shown that compulsory licensing has not on the 
whole been deleterious when applied as part of an antitrust remedy, he is also careful to 
limit his support to this context only.”). Ian Ayres and Eric Talley have persuasively argued 
that the very existence of compulsory licensing rules can encourage patent holders to bar-
gain privately. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 82, at 1094 (“Indeed, the inability of a court 
to tailor a damages award and the existence of litigation costs can often improve the ability 
of the parties to reach a consensual, efficient agreement on their own terms, not those dictat-
ed by the underlying liability rule.”). Although liability rules might facilitate bargains in 
small concentrated settings, they have not been shown to encourage broader systemic forms 
of collective action of the kind believed to affect the process of innovation. 
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licensing fees. By contrast, a liability regime could hinder innovation 
through systematic under-compensation — seemingly an unavoidable 
risk if patent holders are to be denied any control over the royalties 
they collect. However, there may be a middle road in which bargain-
ing failures are averted, and in which inventors can influence the roy-
alties they collect: collective patent valuation. 
 C. The Theory of Collective Patent Valuation 
Property holders can, and often do, take steps to remedy property-
pricing problems by forming private collective rights organizations. 
From condominium associations to agricultural collectives to musical 
copyright licensing groups, the design of such groups varies widely in 
practice. However, all operate on a simple principle: They permit 
property owners to draw value from what they own through systems 
of collective decision-making. Most commonly, this entails voting 
over key decisions that influence the distribution of wealth.
87
 Such 
voting systems give individual property holders a degree of control 
over their profits that they would not otherwise enjoy under a compul-
sory licensing system. Thus, if patent pools truly promote innovation 
investments, one would expect them to follow a similar template. 
Some of the best-documented episodes of collective property val-
uation appear in the studies of Elinor Ostrom.
88
 A pioneer of the new 
institutional economics, Ostrom examined how self-governed com-
munities preserve scarce natural resources.
89
 This inquiry led Ostrom 
to visit resource-sharing communities around the globe — from re-
mote Japanese villages to Swiss mountain towns.90 Across such di-
verse settings, Ostrom identified a unifying theme: In one form or 
another, collective choice arrangements were almost always a basis 
for ongoing cooperation and efficient distribution of wealth and prop-
erty in long-enduring collectives.
91
 
In one case study, Ostrom reported on an agricultural commune in 
Alicante, Spain that relied on voting to manage the use of water.
92
 For 
centuries, the individual owners of water rights in the region had 
pooled their collective rights into a syndicate.93 The Alicante irriga-
tion syndicate leased these aggregated water rights out to small land-
                                                                                                                  
87. See generally Yoram Barzel & Tim R. Sass, The Allocation of Resources by Voting, 
105 Q. J. ECON. 745 (1990) (presenting a general economic theory of voting in the context 
of owners’ associations of newly developed condominiums). 
88. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 17. 
89. See id. at 182–83 (suggesting that the tragedy of the commons does not always accu-
rately describe how communities work in practice). 
90. See generally id. 
91. See id. at 90, 93 (identifying “collective-choice arrangements” as a fundamental de-
sign principle reflected in long-enduring collectives). 
92. See id. at 78–80. 
93. See id. at 79–80. 
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owners.
94
 Members of the syndicate met regularly to vote over profit 
sharing and decisions related to securing contracts with outside water 
suppliers.
95
 The group allocated one vote to each individual, rather 
than weighting votes based on, for instance, the size of property hold-
ings.
96
 Echoing the words of an earlier historian, Ostrom attributed the 
strength and stability of the Alicante irrigation syndicate to its “demo-
cratic and representative character.”
97
 
Commentators have similarly documented the use of collective 
valuation procedures to govern the use of real estate. For example, 
empirical studies have revealed that voting is the basis for nearly all 
decision-making within condominiums.
98
 In an article exploring the 
condominium model, Michael Heller and Rick Hills argued that pri-
vate voting is an optimal means of managing property rights because 
it allows property owners, rather than government authorities, to set 
prices.
99
 Experimental studies conducted by scholars in the field of 
public choice substantiate this assertion.
100
 
Public laws also draw on the power of democratic self-
governance to manage property rights.101 In a 2010 publication, 
Thomas Merrill reported on how home owners in New Haven, Con-
necticut voted over the question of whether to create a neighborhood 
historic preservation district.
102
 This measure promised to increase the 
value of individual homes, but threatened to limit owner autonomy by 
restricting the exterior modifications that could be made to homes.103 
A Connecticut state law called for the decision to be voted on under 
“one-owner, one-vote” rules similar to those used by the Alicante irri-
gation syndicate.
104
 The community ultimately decided against creat-
ing the district — a decision that Merrill believed was more legitimate 
                                                                                                                  
94. See id. at 78–79. 
95. See id. at 80. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 81 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
98. See Barzel & Sass, supra note 87, at 760 (stating that condominium developers are 
legally bound to “specify the allocation of votes and assessments among condominium unit 
owners”); see also id. at 748 (“By internalizing exchange, such voting organizations avoid 
certain transaction costs that would be incurred with market exchange.”).  
99. See Heller & Hills, supra note 18, at 1470 (“Unlike eminent domain, the residents 
controlling [a land assembly district] would have a veto over whether or not to proceed with 
land assembly: if the municipality or developer does not offer a price satisfactory to the 
[land assembly district’s] constituents, then the assembly of land would not go forward.”). 
100. See generally James M. Walker et al., Collective Choice in the Commons: Experi-
mental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes, 110 ECON. J. 212 (2000). 
101. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 291 (2012) (setting forth special voting rules to be used within 
agricultural collectives); 12 U.S.C. § 1760 (2012) (setting forth voting rules to be used 
within federal credit unions). 
102. Merrill, supra note 18, at 276. 
103. Id. at 287. 
104. Id. at 275; see also id. at 288 (“Each owner of property having an assessed property 
tax valuation of at least $1000 on which property taxes were paid in the previous year is 
entitled to one vote.”). 
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and informed than one that local government officials could have 
come to on their own.
105
 
Robert Merges has documented the use of collective decision-
making in the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publish-
ers (“ASCAP”).
106
 ASCAP licenses its members’ copyrighted musical 
works to outsiders in exchange for royalties which it distributes back 
to its members through a pro rata formula.
107
 As Merges explained, 
members of ASCAP vote over major decisions, including the election 
of a “Classification Committee” that determines the royalties mem-
bers receive.
108
 Unlike the “one-owner, one-vote” rule used in the 
examples already discussed, ASCAP apportions voting power based 
on the number of times a member’s musical work is licensed.
109
 
Merges reported that although some members have argued that this 
weighted voting system is undemocratic, most members appear to be 
pleased with how royalties are distributed.
110
 
Such empirical studies have inspired a vast body of theoretical 
literature on the virtues of voting over property. Public choice experts 
have observed that voting encourages deliberation and communication 
between rights holders, allowing property to be governed by the “wis-
dom of crowds.”
111
 Economic theorists believe that voting systems 
promote economic efficiency by allowing property holders to draw 
the maximum possible value from their individual assets.
112
 Property 
theorists have opined that, unlike liability regimes, voting regimes 
allow those with the greatest familiarity and knowledge of a market-
place — owners — to set prices optimally.
113
 Luminaries from the 
                                                                                                                  
105. Id. at 293 (opining that, by restricting voting to property owners, the community as-
sured a “well-informed and motivated electorate”); see also id. at 310. 
106. See Merges, supra note 11, at 1328–40 (discussing the history and internal govern-
ance of ASCAP). 
107. See id. at 1329 (explaining that ASCAP “monitors the songs played and divides up 
the total receipts among all members on the basis of a complex pro rata formula”). 
108. Id. at 1339 (discussing the activities of ASCAP’s Classification Committee). 
109. See id. at 1339 n.152 (explaining the details of the formula). 
110. See id. at 1338, 1338 n.145. 
111. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 1462–63 (2011) (explaining the popular notion of the “wisdom of crowds”); 
Walker et al., supra note 100, at 231 (concluding that “voting substantially increases the 
efficiency of the outcomes achieved” through collective decision-making in the context of 
common resource-sharing communities, and moreover, that “[t]he very act of making a 
proposal and voting on a set of proposals . . . appears to generate information that enables a 
learning process to occur”). 
112. See generally, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW 
HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND 
LAND-USE POLICIES (2001) (arguing that homeowners seeking to maximize the value of 
their homes will vote in local elections). 
113. See, e.g., David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in 
Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461, 479 (1992). 
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new institutionalist school likewise argue that voting systems lead to 
efficient resource allocations.
114
 
These observations support the alluring theory that patent holders 
can be expected to form private regimes that act as forums for collec-
tive valuation, reducing transaction costs and holdout risks while in-
centivizing innovation. The roots of this theory appear in a 1990 
economics paper written by Yoram Barzel and Tim R. Sass in which 
the authors predicted that voting regimes would emerge to allocate 
resources among multiple property holders.
115
 Several years later, 
Robert Merges posited that patent licensing institutions governed by 
voting rules “tend to emerge” in order to overcome bargaining prob-
lems.116 Merges drew empirical support from the structure of two pa-
tent pools: a 1916 patent pool relating to folding beds and a 1917 
patent pool relating to aircraft.
117
 Merges’ optimistic view is rein-
forced by the fact that antitrust authorities review the structure of pa-
tent pools in order to ensure they do not harm competition.
118
 
If private patent holders tend to preserve innovation even as they 
cooperate, then perhaps the proper focus of patent reform need not be 
on the government’s apportionment or valuation of patents, but rather 
on fostering and monitoring private licensing collectives. In other 
words, perhaps the patent system does not need to be “fixed” after all. 
The Theory of Collective Patent Valuation demands empirical 
study. Existing empirical literature on patent pools, while immensely 
valuable, has not explored the interaction between governance and 
innovation.
119
 For example, economists Anne Layne-Farrar and Josh-
ua Lerner examined rent-sharing formulas in modern standard-setting 
patent pools, but their work did not explicitly address how the gov-
ernance of those pools related to innovation incentives.
120
 The dearth 
of scholarship on this subject is due in part to the fact that the con-
tracts that bind such organizations are not widely available. In fact, 
the only historical account of voting within patent pools appears in 
Robert Merges’ 1996 publication on collective rights groups.121 Thus, 
the possibility that private collectives will arise to cure our ailing pa-
                                                                                                                  
114. See, e.g., Walker et al., supra note 100, at 231 (“[V]oting substantially increases the 
efficiency of the [experimental] outcomes achieved.”). 
115. See generally Barzel & Sass, supra note 87. 
116. Merges, supra note 11, at 1392 (“Firms work together to establish a collective price 
charged to licensees for use of the members’ [intellectual property rights]. . . . Where firms 
are involved in such transactions repeatedly, institutions . . . tend to emerge.”). 
117. Id. at 1343–50. 
118. See Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 6, 1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/ 
public/guidelines/0558.htm#t55. 
119. See supra note 1 (highlighting empirical scholarship related to patent pools). 
120. See generally Layne-Farrar & Lerner, supra note 1. 
121. See generally supra note 1 and accompanying text; Merges, supra note 11. 
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tent system enjoys theoretical support,
122
 but lacks empirical ground-
ing. 
III. A STUDY OF COLLECTIVE GOVERNANCE 
Can we expect patent holders to privately remedy the pricing 
problems that threaten innovation? This question hinges on how pa-
tent pools are governed — a topic that has not yet been explored by 
legal scholars. In search of answers, this Part presents an original 
study of fifty-two patent licensing agreements in operation between 
1856 and 2013. These contracts show that many patent pools place the 
power to apportion royalties exclusively in the hands of their found-
ers. Newcomers, when they are permitted to join these groups, rarely 
have control over the royalties they draw. As a result, most patent 
pools do not support the Theory of Collective Patent Valuation. How-
ever, some such institutions may still be capable of encouraging inno-
vation through “rough-and-ready” rent-sharing rules that benefit 
repeat players. 
Because there is no single historical record of all patent pools, the 
information described here is drawn from numerous sources, includ-
ing exhibits to antitrust lawsuits housed in regional repositories of the 
National Archives, records of congressional investigations on patent 
pooling, FOIA requests directed to the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, 
the Wisconsin State Historical Society, the New York State Library in 
Albany, the files of academic historians, and in some instances, patent 
licensing organizations themselves. This study also draws on inter-
views with attorneys and executives directly involved in present-day 
licensing groups. 
This study is as comprehensive as possible in light of available 
historical records. It is likely, however, that some groups of patent 
holders did not preserve records of their cooperation; others may have 
relied on oral agreements or tacit understandings that left no trace. As 
a result, there is a possibility of sampling bias. While this possibility 
should not be ignored, its significance should also not be overestimat-
ed. The set of episodes described herein may be incomplete but none-
theless unbiased, or biased in a way that only downplays this study’s 
chief conclusions — i.e., the design of undocumented patent pools 
may be similar to the pools described herein. 
The dates on which these groups formed are revealing. As the list 
in the Appendix shows, collective patent licensing in the United States 
reached a peak during the 1930s and then precipitously dropped off 
until the late 1990s.123 One possible explanation for this pattern is the 
                                                                                                                  
122. See supra notes 111–18 and accompanying text.  
123. See infra Appendix. 
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loosening and subsequent tightening of antitrust scrutiny during the 
early-to-mid twentieth century.
124
 The recent resurgence in collective 
licensing, which began in the late 1990s, appears to have been primar-
ily motivated by the development and widespread use of digital com-
munications and media standards.
125
 As of this writing, the upswing is 
continuing and has reached beyond such technological standards to 
pharmaceuticals and environmentally sustainable technologies.
126
 
A. Ex Ante Bargains 
Of the fifty-two patent licensing groups in this study, twenty were 
not designed to apportion royalties to new patents.127 Instead, these 
organizations carried out ex ante bargains related to products or meth-
ods in existence at the time of agreement. All such bargains delivered 
fixed royalties to their founders, as measured either in dollar amounts 
for every machine built by licensees, or by percentages of total incom-
ing royalties. The static nature of these cooperatives obviated any 
need for elaborate systems of collective patent valuation. Future tech-
nologies were rarely contemplated in these agreements, let alone pro-
moted by them. The following descriptions of three such groups — 
The Singer Combination, the Consolidated Seeded Raisin Company, 
and the Indiana Manufacturing Company — offer important insights 
into the more complex arrangements described later in this Part.  
The Singer Combination, as it was called, was America’s first pa-
tent pool and is exemplary of the ex ante licensing structure.
128
 The 
Singer Combination was formed in 1856 by three of the largest sew-
ing machine manufacturers in the United States: the Wheeler & Wil-
son Manufacturing Company, the Grover & Baker Sewing Machine 
Company, and I. M. Singer & Company.
129
 At an October meeting in 
Albany, the chiefs of all three companies contracted into a byzantine 
                                                                                                                  
124. See generally Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy 
Evolution, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2004). 
125. See infra Appendix. 
126. See id. 
127. Fixed-sum organizations related to the following subject matter: sewing machines 
(1856), pneumatic straw stackers (1895), bathtubs (1899), and bicycle and motorcycle 
brakes (1913). See id. Fixed-percentage organizations related to the following subject mat-
ter: steel-making (1866), seeded raisins (1900), liquid door checks (1909), beds (1916), 
automobile bumpers (1916), oil refining (1921), flat glass (1924), rail joint bars (1931), oil 
refining (1933), hydraulic oil pumps (1933), variable condensers (1934), plexigum (1935), 
pour depressants (1938), fuse cutouts (1938), furniture slipcovers (1938), and elastic stock-
ings (1949). See id. 
128. See generally Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thick-
et: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165 (2011) (chronicling the 
history of the Singer Combination). 
129. Agreement between Elias Howe, Jr., the Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co., the Grover & 
Baker Sewing Machine Co., and I. M. Singer & Co. (Oct. 24, 1856) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Singer Agreement]. 
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web of cross-licenses and commitments wherein each member re-
ceived permission from the others to manufacture a limited number of 
sewing machines of various types each year.
130
 The price to be 
charged to consumers for each machine was dictated in the Singer 
Agreement, as were the royalties that each member would receive 
from outside manufacturers: 
In case of any future license to other parties under 
the patents enumerated in the two last preceding sec-
tions, and owned by the parties hereto, the license 
fee shall be fifteen dollars for each machine for the 
right under all of the said patents . . . and shall be 
shared by the said parties as follows, viz: five dollars 
to said Howe, five dollars to I. M. Singer & Compa-
ny, and five dollars to the Grover & Baker Sewing 
Machine Company, and Wheeler & Wilson Manu-
facturing Company . . . .
131
 
Because the founding members of the Singer Combination were 
sewing machine manufacturers as well as patent holders, the Singer 
Agreement also dictated the amounts that each member would pay the 
others for every machine they built and sold.
132
 Because these sums 
were laid out in the agreement, it is clear that they were based entirely 
on ex ante bargaining. For instance, the Grover & Baker Sewing Ma-
chine Company promised to pay I. M. Singer & Company five dollars 
for every machine it manufactured in excess of an agreed upon num-
ber.
133
 The Singer Agreement allocated no royalties for new (i.e., af-
ter-acquired) patent rights.
134
 
Some patent pools divided royalties to members based on per-
centages rather than fixed sums.135 The United States Consolidated 
Seeded Raisin Company, a California-based patent licensing collec-
tive formed in 1900, is representative of this design:
136
 The organiza-
tion’s founding members included four corporations and four 
individuals, each of whom owned patents on machinery and processes 
for raisin seeding.
137
 These eight founders assigned their patents to a 
new corporation — the United States Consolidated Seeded Raisin 
                                                                                                                  
130. See id. 
131. Id. 
132. See id. 
133. See id. 
134. See generally id. 
135. See supra note 127.  
136. See Agreement between the U.S. Consol. Seeded Raisin Co., the Forsyth Raisin 
Process Co., the Forsyth Seeded Raisin Co., the Griffin & Skelly Co., the Cal. Seeding 
Machine Co., William M. Griffin, Thomas E. Langley, Cary S. Cox, and Lee L. Gray (June 
26, 1900) (on file with author) [hereinafter Seeded Raisin Agreement]. 
137. See id. 
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Company — which was formed specifically to administer patent li-
censing and royalty sharing.
138
 The agreement entered into by all 
members divided incoming royalties into five fixed percentages.
139
 
Tellingly, the contract recited the percentages that specific patents 
“earned,” indicating that the group did not contemplate the inclusion 
of new patents or new members: 
The royalties which shall be received upon license 
contracts issued under and by virtue of this agree-
ment shall . . . [be] distributed and paid over as fol-
lows: 40 per cent. to said United States Consolidated 
Seeded Raisin Company on account of said Letters 
Patent, No. 543833 and 543834; 30 per cent. to said 
Forsyth Raisin Process Company, its successors and 
assigns, on account of said Letters Patent 611782; 20 
per cent. to the present owners of said Letters Patent 
619698; 6 per cent. to Thomas E. Langley and Cary 
S. Cox, their legal representatives and assigns, on 
account of said Letters Patent 641938 and 641939; 
and 4 per cent. to said California Seeding Machine 
Company, its successors and assigns, on account of 
said Letters Patent No. 614178; and said pending ap-
plication for Letters Patent, Serial No. 679223.140 
Interestingly, the Seeded Raisin Agreement stipulated that royalty 
distributions between the group’s founders would shift proportionally 
as individual patents were declared invalid by a court.141 This provi-
sion adds a degree of dynamism to the United States Consolidated 
Seeded Raisin Company’s royalty-sharing arrangement, but not the 
kind that would encourage innovation: It shifted royalties only in re-
sponse to the invalidation of existing patent rights, but did not direct 
royalties to new patent rights. 
In contrast to the Seeded Raisin and Singer Agreements, one pa-
tent pool based on ex ante bargaining did appear to contemplate future 
technologies: The Indiana Manufacturing Company (“IMC”), a corpo-
ration formed in 1895, acted as a clearinghouse for patent rights relat-
ed to agricultural machinery.
142
 In an agreement that accompanied its 
standard patent license to manufacturers, the IMC sought licensees’ 
promises to “endeavor to improve upon Pneumatic Stackers,” and to 
                                                                                                                  
138. See id. 
139. See id. 
140. Id. (emphases added). 
141. Id. (“[I]n case any of the above mentioned letters patent shall be judicially deter-
mined to be invalid . . . the share of royalties hereinbefore apportioned to and on account of 
such letters patent, shall hereafter not be paid . . . .”). 
142. See Form Agreement issued by the IMC (1914) (on file with author). 
No. 2] Power and Governance in Patent Pools 443 
 
convey to the corporation all future patent rights that covered such 
improvements.
143
 In exchange for these promises, the IMC promised 
to pay licensees five dollars for each pneumatic stacker manufactured 
under its licenses.
144
 Although this provision was forward looking, it 
dictated a fixed amount for any and all new patent rights rather than a 
procedure for collective valuation. In this respect, the provision placed 
inventors in essentially the same position they would find themselves 
in a compulsory licensing regime — entirely subject to valuations 
performed by an institution.145 
The above three agreements, along with a substantial proportion 
of documented patent pools, were not structured to act as forums for 
patent valuation and, therefore, do not bear out the predictions of the 
Theory of Collective Patent Valuation. Because these arrangements 
generally related only to patents in existence at the time of agreement, 
they had no need for procedures to determine the royalties that new 
patents would earn. There were simply not many ongoing decisions 
for these short-term oriented groups to make. 
B. Corporate Dividends 
Corporate issuance of dividends is a second mechanism that has 
been adopted to apportion royalties within patent pools.
146
 Fifteen 
patent pools identified in this study were corporations that acquired 
full ownership of patents held by their members in exchange for stock 
that periodically yielded dividends.
147
 Unlike the ex ante bargains 
described in the foregoing Part, these share-based groups were capa-
ble of directing a portion of their profits to the contributors of after-
acquired patent rights. However, the decisions that governed the roy-
alties that such patents earned — e.g., the amount of stock to be of-
fered to an inventor in exchange for a patent, the amount of a given 
dividend distribution, the timing of dividend distributions — were 
made by officers of these organizations, and not by shareholders. As a 
                                                                                                                  
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. The company was named as an assignee in just six patents issued after the date of 
the group’s formation in 1895. U.S. Patent No. 997,936 (filed Oct. 13, 1910); U.S. Patent 
No. 1,028,793 (filed Apr. 29, 1910); U.S. Patent No. 902,841 (filed Apr. 13, 1908); U.S. 
Patent No. 821,584 (filed Aug. 15, 1904); U.S. Patent No. 722,369 (filed Apr. 14, 1902); 
U.S. Patent No. 566,491 (filed Jan. 14, 1896). This small number of additional patents sug-
gests that the group’s valuation system failed to encourage patenting.  
146. Share-based organizations related to the following subject matter: fiberglass (1956), 
women’s hosiery (1955), wrinkle finishes (1952), air conditioning (1943), petroleum refin-
ing (1935), lecithin production (1934), machine tools (1933), water conditioning (1930), 
coated abrasives (1929), peach pitting (1926), radio (1919), footwear (1899), farming tools 
(1890), and steel-making (1877, 1890). See infra Appendix. 
147. See id. Although many patent pools discussed in this paper were incorporated, only 
the pools described in this Part relied exclusively on the issuance of dividends as the mech-
anism for profit sharing. 
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result, these share-based groups were not truly platforms or forums for 
collective patent valuation. 
The Pneumatic Steel Corporation, a steel patent licensing group 
formed in the late-nineteenth century, illustrates the share-based de-
sign.
148
 The group was born from a dispute: In the late 1850s, two 
American investor groups acquired patent rights to the “Bessemer 
process” — a breakthrough in steelmaking technology.
149
 One group 
of investors held patents developed by Sir Henry Bessemer, the origi-
nal inventor of the process.
150
 A second group held a blocking patent 
derived from experiments with related processes.
151
 
Faced with this legal impasse, the two steelmaking concerns con-
solidated their patent rights — initially under a trust and later through 
a corporation.152 The Pneumatic Steel Corporation, as it was named, 
granted the various patent holders and their beneficiaries dividend-
yielding stock in return for their assignment of patent rights.
153
 Ten 
thousand shares were distributed in total.
154
 These shares were dis-
tributed between the Kelley Process Company and the Albany inves-
tors based on the numerical ratio of patents that each group 
contributed.
155
 Private correspondence between the group and one 
shareholder shows that dividends were distributed several times each 
year.
156
 
                                                                                                                  
148. See THOMAS J. MISA, A NATION OF STEEL 19–21 (2d ed. 1999) (describing the dis-
pute that gave rise to the consolidation of Bessemer patents). 
149. Id. at 17–19. 
150. Id. at 19. 
151. See id. at 19–20.  
152. Id. at 20; see also The Bulletin of the American Iron and Steel Association (Oct. 27, 
1869) (advertisement) (on file with author) (identifying the trusteeship titled “THE 
TRUSTEES OF THE PNEUMATIC OR BESSEMER PROCESS OF MAKING IRON 
AND STEEL”); The Pneumatic or Bessemer Process of Making Iron and Steel (1865) (bro-
chure) (on file with author) (describing the trusteeship of which Z. S. Durfee of Philadelphia 
was the general agent). Evidence of the corporation, which was titled “The Pneumatic Steel 
Association,” appears in correspondence received by the beneficiaries of John A. Griswold, 
who was an original shareholder. Letters from Z. S. Durfee of The Pneumatic Steel Ass’n to 
the Ex’rs of the Late John A. Griswold (1873–74) (on file with author) [hereinafter Gris-
wold Letters]. 
153. See Griswold Letters, supra note 152. 
154. See id. 
155. The Bessemer Association first took form in 1866. See MISA, supra note 148 at 19–
20. At that time, the Kelley/Ward group had been granted three patents. See Anthony Wil-
liam Deller, Social and Economic Impact of Patents, 46 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 424, 434 (1964) 
(stating that William Kelly was granted U.S. Patent Nos. 16,444, 17,628, and 18,910). The 
Troy investors held seven patents at the time the association took form. See id. (listing two 
Bessemer patents); Articles of Ass’n of the Bessemer Steel Co. Ltd. (Mar. 1, 1877) (on file 
with the author) (listing an additional five Bessemer patents). The Troy investors received 
seventy percent and the Kelley/Ward group received thirty percent. See Thomas J. Misa, 
Controversy and Closure in Technological Change: Constructing “Steel,” in SHAPING 
TECHNOLOGY / BUILDING SOCIETY: STUDIES IN SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE 109, 123 
(Wiebe E. Bijker & John Law eds., 1st ed. 1992).  
156. See Griswold Letters, supra note 152. 
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It appears that the Pneumatic Steel Corporation either did not ad-
mit or, alternatively, did not attract outside patent holders: When the 
corporation was restructured as the Bessemer Steel Company in 
1877,
157
 the new corporation’s articles of association listed only the 
patents originally held by the organization along with six after-
acquired patents developed by the founding members.
158
 This shows 
that, during its eleven years in operation, the Pneumatic Steel Corpo-
ration acquired no patents developed by outside inventors.  
In addition to limiting the decision-making power of sharehold-
ers, some share-based patent pools limited the transferability of 
stock.
159
 For example, a 1926 corporation that acquired patents on 
machinery and methods of removing the pits from peaches granted 
each of its two founders 2500 shares of common stock valued at $100 
each.
160
 A provision in the pooling agreement limited the availability 
of stock to potential newcomers: 
The parties hereto agree that before either of them 
may sell or otherwise dispose of the whole or any 
portion of the capital stock of the Corporation, and in 
the event a bona fide purchaser shall be obtained 
therefor, the party so wishing to sell or otherwise 
dispose of such stock shall give written notice to the 
other party advising it of the terms of sale or disposi-
tion, and the party to whom such notice is given shall 
have fifteen (15) days after the giving of such notice 
within which to elect to purchase or acquire the stock 
so being offered for sale upon the same terms and 
conditions upon which the bona fide purchaser is 
willing to purchase or acquire said stock, and should 
such party elect to so purchase or acquire such stock, 
it shall have the right to so purchase or acquire the 
same on demand.161 
This limitation is consistent with the theme that united all fifteen 
share-based pools examined in this study: Despite being capable of 
inducing innovation by, for instance, making stock available to inno-
                                                                                                                  
157. See Articles of Ass’n of the Bessemer Steel Co. Ltd. (Mar. 1, 1877) (on file with au-
thor). 
158. The Bessemer Patents were U.S. Patent Nos. 49,051, 49,052, 49,053, 49,054, 
49,055, and 117,968; the Kelly Patent was U.S. Patent No. 17,628 (Reissue 505); the Holley 
Patents were U.S. Patent Nos. 86,303 and 106,162; and, the Fritz Patent was U.S. Patent No. 
133,771. Id. 
159. Five of the fifteen corporate patent pools identified in this study limited the transfer-
ability of stock. 
160. Agreement between Cal. Packing Corp. and Anderson-Barngrover Mfg. Co. (Jun. 
22, 1926) (on file with author). 
161. Id. at 3–4. 
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vators, such groups tended to concentrate patent ownership. Because 
these share-based pools did not give their members a meaningful 
voice in valuation decisions, and because they rarely included new 
members over time, they do not support the Theory of Collective Pa-
tent Valuation. 
C. Rough-and-Ready Formulas 
In contrast to ex ante bargains and corporate decision-makers, 
profit sharing in most patent pools today is governed by individual 
evaluators whose authority is limited by profit sharing formulas. This 
system is less complicated than it may sound: Evaluators decide 
whether a new patent will be included within a given pool, and then 
profit-sharing formulas dictate the royalties the patent’s contributor 
will receive. Of the fifty-two organizations analyzed in this study, six 
fit this design; all six related to technological standards, such as the 
MPEG video format, and the RFID and 3G wireless data protocols.
162
 
As the following examples illustrate, these groups favor “rough-and-
ready” cooperation over democratic systems of collective valuation.
163
 
The MPEG-2 patent pool, which governs patents related to a vari-
ety of digital video technologies, demonstrates how formula-based 
royalty sharing works. The group was formed in 1997 by Fujitsu, 
Mitsubishi, Philips, Sony, and several other companies that held pa-
tent rights related to the underlying technology.164 Today, the group’s 
membership has expanded to over twenty patent holders.165 The 
MPEG-2 patent pool allocates royalties to its members according to 
pro rata rules as follows: 
(P/N) x M, where P is the number of the Party’s 
MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio Patent(s) in the country, N 
                                                                                                                  
162. Formula-based licensing organizations related to the following subject matter: RFID 
wireless data transport (2008), H.264 digital video (2004), 3G mobile communications 
(2001), IEEE 1394 “Firewire” data transport (1999), Digital Video Disc storage (1998), and 
MPEG-2 video (1997). See infra Appendix. 
163. The practice of shifting royalties over time first appeared in the 1930s. For instance, 
in a 1933 patent pool relating to a petroleum refining process, a complex graded-valuation 
formula was designed to lower the percentage of royalties that one patent holder would 
receive for the first five years following the agreement. See Agreement Between Standard 
Oil Co. (N.J.), Standard Oil Dev. Co., Union Oil Co. (Cal.), Standard Oil Co. (Ind.), and 
The M. W. Kellogg Co. (Oct. 27, 1933) (on file with author) [hereinafter HC Technique 
Agreement]. 
164. See Letter from Garrard R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell, to Joel I. Klein, Acting 
Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Apr. 28, 1997) (on file 
with author) (detailing the development of the MPEG-2 standard) [hereinafter MPEG-2 
Letter]; Seth Goldstein, Consolidation of DVD Royalties Collection is Goal of MPEG LA, 
BILLBOARD, http://iviewit.tv/CompanyDocs/Copy%20of%20MPEG%20Articles/1997%200 
8%2007.pdf (last visited May 7, 2014) (Lucent was not an original member of MPEG LA).  
165. MPEG-2 Licensors, MPEG LA, http://www.mpegla.com/main/programs/M2/Pages/ 
Licensors.aspx (last visited May 7, 2014). 
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is the total number of MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio Pa-
tent(s) in that country included in the MPEG-2 Pa-
tent Portfolio, and M is the total royalties considered 
paid on MPEG Patent Portfolio Patent(s) in that 
country . . . .
166
 
Thus, Sony, who as of this writing contributed 218 out of the 
MPEG-2 group’s 494 total patents, is currently allocated forty-four 
percent of all royalties.
167
 
By valuing all patents equally, the MPEG pool’s pro rata formula 
makes fine-grained patent valuations impossible. For instance, a new 
and valuable patent that required years of costly research would draw 
the same amount of royalties as a less valuable patent. As some com-
mentators have observed, such formulas may create perverse incen-
tives for members to simply file high numbers of patent applications 
and to claim that many patents are “essential.”
168
 
Some standards-based patent pools have adopted more complex 
formulas to discourage such behavior. For instance, the RFID patent 
pool alters the pro rata formula such that “half of the royalties are al-
located to participants based on the number of patents contributed by 
each participant, and the other half are allocated substantially equally 
among participants.”
169
 By hinging fifty percent of all royalties on the 
pure number of members within the group rather than the number of 
patents within the group, this hybrid approach could limit strategic 
patenting behavior. However, this formula arguably results in an even 
cruder division of royalties than a purely pro rata formula.
170
 
A second type of formula adopted by some groups gradually ap-
portions fewer royalties to patents over time. The DVD patent pool, 
for instance, allocates royalties to patent holders on the basis of how 
old their patents are.
171
 According to the group’s organizers, this for-
                                                                                                                  
166. Agreement between the Trs. of Columbia Univ., Fujitsu Ltd., Gen. Instrument 
Corp., Lucent Technologies Inc., Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Philips Electronics N.V., U.S. 
Philips Corp., Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., and Sony Corp. (1996) (on file with author) [herein-
after MPEG-2 Agreement]. 
167. Compare id., with MPEG-2 Attachment 1, MPEG LA, http://www.mpegla.com/ 
main/programs/m2/Documents/m2-att1.pdf (last visited May 7, 2014) (listing all MPEG-2 
patents as of the last visited date, including those patents contributed by Sony Corporation). 
The aforementioned list will have changed by the publication date of this Article. 
168. See, e.g., Layne-Farrar & Lerner, supra note 1, at 296 (“This maintains some stabil-
ity in royalty shares over time, with all adjustments made at the time of license renewal, but 
does not eliminate the perverse incentive to patent aggressively.”). 
169. Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div. of the Dep’t 
of Justice, to William F. Dolan and Geoffrey Oliver, Jones Day (Oct. 21, 2008) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter RFID Letter]. 
170. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the value of an individual patent 
within a licensing group is more closely a product of the total number of patents within the 
group than the total number of members. 
171. See Letter from Carey R. Ramos, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, to Joel 
I. Klein, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div. of the Dep’t of Justice (Oct. 9, 1998), 
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mula was selected to encourage contributors to license new and valu-
able patent rights to the collective.
172
 This approach seems to assume 
that older patents are always less valuable than newer ones. As such, 
graded royalty sharing, like pro rata distributions, appears as a rough-
and-ready approximation of patent value. 
All formula-based groups charge a single decision-maker with the 
task of determining whether or not to include a new patent in the mix. 
As a result, the only way that a prospective innovator could influence 
his profits in a formula-based regime is by helping to define the 
standard around which a patent pool is organized. The MPEG-2 patent 
pool provides a helpful example of how this can be done. Between 
1988 and 1994, the MPEG-2 standard was drafted and defined by an 
open working group of engineers and experts from over one hundred 
technology companies. Collaboration was coordinated by a standard-
setting entity called “ISO/IEC.”
173
 
Once the first draft of the MPEG-2 standard was defined, several 
members agreed to allow two outside experts to identify patents that 
were “essential” to the technology.
174
 Entities that held one or more 
essential patents included many participants in the standard-setting 
group, including Columbia University, Fujitsu, General Instrument, 
Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Philips, Scientific-Atlanta, and Sony.
175
 These 
founding organizations agreed to a pro rata royalty division formu-
la,
176
 and formed an independent limited liability company called 
“MPEG LA” to administer licensing and royalty collections.177 In this 
way, only organizations that participated in the standard-setting pro-
cess for MPEG LA had opportunities to have their patented technolo-
gies incorporated into the final standard, and consequently, into the 
patent pool.178 
Although formula-based patent pools do not value individual pa-
tents carefully, their lack of precision may be compensated for over 
                                                                                                                  
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/request-letters/302365.pdf (dis-
cussing the impartial expert valuation of those patents in the pool after the first two year, 
then every four years, in order to determine the fraction of royalties to be granted to that 
patent) [hereinafter DVD Letter].  
172. Id. 
173. MPEG-2 Letter, supra note 164. 
174. Id. at 11 (“Under Dr. Rubenstein’s direction, and with the assistance of Cliff Reader, 
Ph.D [sic] . . . approximately 8,000 United States patent abstracts were reviewed . . . . [T]he 
essential patent holders believe that the proposed licensing arrangement includes most, but 
not all, MPEG-2 essential patents.”). 
175. See id. at 2 n.1; see also Goldstein, supra note 164 (stating that Lucent decided not 
to join the organization). 
176. See MPEG-2 Agreement, supra note 166, at 14–15 (explaining the royalty division 
formula). 
177. MPEG-2 Letter, supra note 164. 
178. See generally, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-
Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002) (describing the processes used by 
standard-setting organizations). 
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time: For instance, a formula that over-values roughly the same num-
ber of patents as it under-values could still satisfactorily value collec-
tions of patents in the aggregate. This possibility, combined with the 
open membership of nearly all such groups identified in this study, 
may offer a strong innovation incentive to patent holders who expect 
to contribute multiple patents to a single pool. In fact, such rough-and-
ready rules may more efficiently encourage repeat players to innovate 
than would complex collective valuation procedures, such as voting 
over key decisions. 
D. Patent Assessors 
Two organizations analyzed in this study compensated innovators 
based purely on the valuations of patent assessors selected by the 
group.179 Because these two groups offered patent contributors a voice 
in valuation decisions, they most clearly support the Theory of Collec-
tive Patent Valuation. 
The first patent pool to include an assessor was the 1917 Manu-
facturers Aircraft Association (“MAA”), an organization formed to 
facilitate the production of military aircraft during the First World 
War.
180
 The MAA’s membership agreement included the following 
provision, which dictated how such assessments would be made: 
When a “Subscriber” shall hereafter acquire a United 
States airplane patent, or any right thereunder, he 
shall be entitled to compensation for the use thereof 
if the patent or patent right covers an invention 
which secures the performance of a function not be-
fore known to the art . . . or is otherwise of striking 
character or constitutes a radical departure from pre-
vious practice . . . . Such report and claim shall be 
submitted to a Board of Arbitration to be selected in 
the manner provided for in paragraph XIII hereof, 
which Board shall determine whether such compen-
sation shall be paid, and, if so, the total amount 
thereof and the rate of royalty, or other payments, 
which shall be paid . . . .181 
When the MAA formed, industry and government regulators were 
concerned that this provision’s compensation scheme would unfairly 
allow the group’s founders to access new patents for uncompetitively 
                                                                                                                  
179. HC Technique oil refining (1933) and aircraft (1917). See infra Appendix. 
180. Form Agreement Issued by the MAA (Jul. 24, 1917) (on file with author). 
181. Id. 
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low prices.
182
 Prompted by these concerns, the U.S. Attorney General 
conducted an investigation of the MAA in 1917.
183
 The Attorney 
General acknowledged that the compensation scheme could harm 
competition, but also noted that it served a useful purpose by “keeping 
the patents of each of the subscribers open to all.”184 In light of this, 
he stated that any concerns about the agreement’s potential for abuse 
“scarcely justif[y] its condemnation in the absence of such abuse.”
185
 
The second example of an organization employing patent asses-
sors demonstrates a unique solution to the problem of patent valua-
tion. In 1933, multiple oil companies held overlapping patents on a 
valuable process of oil refining.186 To avoid litigation, the companies 
cross-licensed these patents to each other on a royalty-free basis.187 To 
reward the owners of any after-acquired patents, the companies 
agreed to a two-tiered pricing approach in which arbitrators divided 
royalties only if the members could not come to an agreement on their 
own first.188 Here, the assessors were a “backup” only to be relied 
upon when ordinary bargaining failed. 
These two groups offered newcomers a surprising amount of in-
fluence over their potential profits. The MAA’s membership agree-
ment tasked an internal board of arbitrators with determining which 
(if any) future innovations were of a “striking [enough] character” to 
merit compensation.
189
 The board was to be composed of three indi-
viduals: one elected by the inventor seeking compensation, a second 
elected by the MAA’s board of directors, and the third chosen by the 
other two arbiters.
190
 At least two of the three arbiters had to agree for 
any decision to become effective.
191
 
A slightly different representative voting system was used in the 
HC Technique Agreement among the oil refiners.192 Unlike the MAA, 
the HC Technique Agreement relied on representative voting as a 
backup, only to be used in situations where members of the group 
were unable to agree upon a fair division of royalties: 
[T]he parties shall endeavor to agree as to a fair divi-
sion of royalties with respect to said [after-acquired 
patent rights] and, failing such agreement, the parties 
                                                                                                                  
182. See Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n — Antitrust Laws, 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 166, 170 (1920). 
183. Id. at 166–67. 
184. Id. at 170. 
185. Id. 
186. See HC Technique Agreement, supra note 163. 
187. See id. 
188. See id. 
189. MAA, supra note 180. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. See supra notes 186–90 and accompanying text. 
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agree to submit the question of a fair division of the 
royalties to a board of five arbitrators, one of whom 
shall be slected [sic] by each of the parties [to the 
pool] and the other two shall be selected by the said 
three arbitrators.
193
 
As in the MAA, a majority vote of the arbitrators was required for 
any royalty-sharing decision to pass.
194
 This system granted prospec-
tive contributors a limited degree of control over the royalties they 
could collect via the vote cast by the arbitrator they selected.195 
E. Royalty-free Licensing and Cost Savings 
Many patent pools offer important cost savings to their members. 
These savings include access to shared patent rights, immunity from 
challenges to patent validity, and joint funds to offset litigation and 
patent prosecution costs. The desire to lower costs may explain why 
patent holders voluntarily join licensing collectives that offer limited 
control over royalties, and in some cases, no royalties at all. 
Nine institutions examined in this study were not structured to 
collect or to distribute royalties to patent holders.
196
 Instead, these 
groups were formed purely to reduce the risk of patent infringement 
litigation by requiring each member to provide every other member a 
royalty-free license to its covered patent rights. As one would expect, 
these agreements were formed by companies that were both licensors 
and prospective licensees — that is, they manufactured potentially 
infringing products but also held patents of their own. 
The royalty-free institutional design was first adopted by the Au-
tomobile Manufacturers Association (“AMA”) — one of the most 
significant patent licensing collectives in industrial history.
197
 Formed 
in 1914 by a set of leading automobile manufacturers, the AMA at 
one time pooled rights to over one thousand automobile patents con-
tributed by hundreds of members.
198
 As a condition of membership, 
                                                                                                                  
193. HC Technique Agreement, supra note 163. 
194. See id. 
195. See id. 
196. Royalty-free licensing organizations related to the following subject matter: neglect-
ed tropical diseases (2012), HIV (2010), CleanTech (2010, 2008), Linux operating system 
(2005), gene fragments (1999), Bluetooth wireless data (1997), color cinematography 
(1934), and automobiles (1907). See infra Appendix. 
197. See VAUGHAN, supra note 1, at 62–64 (characterizing the AMA as an “outstanding” 
historical example of patent pooling and examining the history of its licensing practices). 
198. Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power: Hearings Pursuant to Public 
Resolution No. 113 Before the Temp. Nat’l Econ. Comm., 75th Cong. 302 (1938) (testimony 
of Alfred Reeves, Vice President and General Manager, AMA) (“One thousand fifty-eight 
live patents are in the cross-licensing agreement at the present time.”) [hereinafter Investiga-
tion of Concentration of Economic Power]; id. at 685–91 (listing all members of the organi-
zation between 1915 and 1940). 
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automobile makers who joined the AMA promised not to sue one an-
other for patent infringement and were required to license all of their 
relevant patent rights on a royalty-free basis to all other members.
199
 
As such, the group was structurally incapable of channeling royalties 
to would-be innovators. 
As a corollary to its institutional design, the AMA did not seek to 
acquire patent rights to future innovations: Each time the organiza-
tion’s massive cross-license was renewed, the contract explicitly ex-
cluded patents that members might obtain in the future.
200
 The AMA’s 
president testified in a 1938 congressional hearing that this limitation 
was intended to appease members who were reluctant to part with 
future patent rights, the value of which was as yet unknown.201 As a 
consequence, the AMA did not encourage innovation by offering pro-
spective inventors the promise of collecting royalties. 
A 1935 royalty-free licensing group related to petroleum refining 
provides another helpful example.202 The group’s five founding mem-
bers — all large oil companies — promised to grant non-transferable 
licenses to a newly formed corporation that acted as the licensing ad-
ministrator.
203
 The members received no royalties or “moneys” in 
exchange for these licenses.
204
 Instead, each received royalty-free ac-
cess to all patents contributed by the other members and royalty-free 
access to any future patents acquired by the corporation.205 Access to 
patent rights was the main inducement to join. 
Contemporary royalty-free patent licensing collectives follow a 
similar format. A recent example is a European-based organization 
called the Medicines Patent Pool (“MPP”).206 Founded in 2010 and 
endorsed by the World Health Organization, the MPP solicits royalty-
free patent licenses on HIV drugs for use in under-developed coun-
tries.207 Like the AMA, the MPP does not channel royalties to its 
                                                                                                                  
199. Form Agreement issued by AMA (undated) (on file with author). See also Investiga-
tion of Concentration of Economic Power, supra note 198, at 300 (testimony of Alfred 
Reeves, Vice President and General Manager, AMA) (“There is no money royalty involved 
of any kind. It is a quid pro quo.”). 
200. See Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power, supra note 198, at 291 (this 
appears to have been due to a “belief that somebody might get out some very good patents 
they wanted to keep for themselves”). 
201. See id. 
202. Agreement between Phillips Petroleum Co., The M. W. Kellogg Co., The Texas 
Co., Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), and Standard Oil Development Co. (Sep. 1, 1935) (on file 
with author). 
203. See id. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. See About the MPP, MEDICINES PATENT POOL, 
http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/about (last visited May 7, 2014). 
207. See id; see also Mattioli, supra note 3, at 121–25 (discussing the origin and devel-
opment of the MPP). 
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members.
208
 As a consequence, its administrators have opted to seek 
licenses for only existing patents covering currently marketed drugs, 
rather than commitments to license future inventions.209 
Another recent example of royalty-free licensing is the World In-
tellectual Property Organization’s (“WIPO”) Re:Search patent licens-
ing initiative. Formed in 2011, this organization aims to facilitate the 
royalty-free licensing of patent rights relevant to neglected tropical 
diseases.
210
 Contributors to Re:Search — which as of this writing in-
clude the pharmaceutical juggernauts Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, and 
Merck — agree to license relevant patent rights to specific licensees 
on a royalty-free basis.
211
 Like the AMA and the MPP, Re:Search 
does not channel royalties to its contributors.
212
 Moreover, the organi-
zation leaves any licensing of future technologies up to individual 
bargaining.
213
 The director of Re:Search, who commented for this 
Article, explained that this approach spurs innovation by permitting 
downstream inventors to “control the prices they wish to charge for 
future patent rights.”
214
 
Royalty-free patent licensing has also taken root in the field of 
computer software. The Open Invention Network (“OIN”), a software 
patent licensing group, is a prime example.
215
 Financially backed in 
2005 by IBM, Novell, Philips, Red Hat, and Sony,
216
 the group’s form 
agreement requires its members to license to all other members spe-
cific classes of software patents related to the Linux operating system 
free of charge.
217
 The OIN’s standard membership agreement, re-
quires all members to “grant to each Licensee . . . a royalty-free, 
worldwide, nonexclusive, non-transferable license under [their] Pa-
tents for making, having made, using, importing, and Distributing any 
                                                                                                                  
208. License Agreement Between Gilead Sciences and MPP (Jul. 11, 2011) (on file with 
author) (describing “a royalty-free, non-exclusive, non-transferable license” to “make, use, 
offer to sell and sell” certain Gilead patents for use in specific countries) [hereinafter MPP 
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209. See Patent Status of ARVs, MEDICINES PATENT POOL, http://www. 
medicinespatentpool.org/patent-data/patent-status-of-arvs (last visited May 7, 2014) (listing 
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210. Guiding Principles of WIPO Re:Search, WIPO RE:SEARCH, http://www.wipo.int/ 
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211. Id.; WIPO Re:Search Members, WIPO RE:SEARCH, http://www.wipo.int/research/ 
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212. Guiding Principles of WIPO Re:Search, supra note 210.  
213. See id. 
214. Telephone Interview with Thomas Bombelles, Director of WIPO Re:Search (Dec. 
16, 2012). 
215. Steve Lohr, Company To Start Offering Free Use of Patents It Holds, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 10, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/10/business/10linux.html. 
216. Id. 
217. Form Agreement issued by the OIN (undated) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/pat_license_agreement.php (last visited May 7, 
2014). 
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Linux System . . . .”
218
 The Agreement defines the “Linux System” as 
only encompassing software with existing functionality.219 Thus, like 
all of the royalty-free licensing groups examined in this study, the 
OIN delivers a fixed return of “zero” to its members and focuses ex-
clusively on facilitating licenses for patent rights to existing technolo-
gies rather than for future innovations. 
Some patent licensing groups not only grant their members access 
to mutually held patents, but also grant them access to patents owned 
by non-member licensees. For instance, the RFID standard license 
discussed earlier requires that any licensee holding an essential patent 
is required to make the patent available to members on “fair, reasona-
ble and non-discriminatory terms.”
220
 The MPEG-2, DVD, and Blue-
tooth licensing groups provide similar terms.
221
 
In addition to affording their members access to patented technol-
ogies, most of the groups examined in this study discourage invalidity 
suits directed at members’ patents. This was most commonly achieved 
through contractual terms that allowed termination of collective 
agreements with licensees who challenged the validity of any patent 
in a portfolio.
222
 Like American pioneers “circling the wagons,” these 
groups marshaled a defensive force that can only be accomplished 
through cooperation. 
Another cost reduction made possible by many patent pools, un-
related to royalty-free status, is access to shared legal funds. A majori-
ty of the episodes examined by this Article allocated incoming 
royalties to help members defend infringement and invalidity suits 
and to fund prosecution of new patent applications. This practice dates 
back to the earliest patent pool examined in this Article — the 1856 
Singer Collective — which provided that all incoming royalties “shall 
be set apart as a patent fund until it amounts to ten thousand dollars, to 
be used for the protection and enforcement of [the pooled] patents.”
223
 
Over time, the uses for such funds expanded. For instance, the 1900 
Seeded Raisin Company provided “a fund of not less than five thou-
sand ($5000.00) dollars for the specific purpose of paying counsel 
                                                                                                                  
218. Id. 
219. Id. (citing Linux Definitions, OPEN INVENTION NETWORK (effective as of Mar. 7, 
2014), http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/pat_linuxdef.php). 
220. Form Agreement issued by RFID Consortium LLC (undated) (on file with author); 
RFID Letter, supra note 169. 
221. MPEG-2 Agreement, supra note 166; DVD Letter, supra note 171; Form Agree-
ment Issued by Bluetooth SIG, Inc. (undated) (on file with author). 
222. See, e.g., RFID Consortium LLC, supra note 220 (“The grant of rights to any Port-
folio Patents may be withheld or withdrawn . . . if . . . Portfolio Licensee or its Affiliates 
challenges the validity or enforceability of any Participant Portfolio patent . . . .”). 
223. Singer Agreement, supra note 129. Any excess was divided among the participants. 
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retainers and fees and expenses of litigation, acquiring inventions and 
letters patent, and securing patents upon such inventions . . . .”
224
 
Ultimately, the value of joining many patent licensing groups lies 
more in cost savings than in the promise of compensation.  
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND POLICY 
A. Implications for Theory 
The foregoing study reveals significant gaps between the Theory 
of Collective Patent Valuation and actual industry practices. To ex-
plore these gaps, it is helpful to briefly revisit the motivation behind 
this study: Our patent system today faces a pricing problem. In order 
to develop new technologies, innovators must gain access to patented 
“building blocks” that are already owned by numerous patent hold-
ers — a costly task, made prohibitively costly by the risk of hold-
outs.
225
 A perennially debated solution to this “anticommons” 
problem is compulsory patent licensing. Under a compulsory regime, 
a court or some other organ of the state would set the royalties that 
patent holders receive.226 Although this solution could reduce transac-
tion costs and holdout risks, it would introduce a new cost: Denying 
patent holders the power to influence the royalties they collect would 
create a risk of under-compensation that could, in turn, limit innova-
tion investments.
227
 
Against this troubling backdrop, some commentators have hy-
pothesized that the market can and will help itself.
228
 Proponents of 
this theory posit that patent pools will naturally emerge to reduce 
transaction costs by bundling complementary patent rights.
229
 At the 
same time, the theory goes, by permitting inventors to have a say over 
the royalties they collect, patent pools would encourage innovation 
more effectively than would a compulsory licensing regime.
230
 This 
would be possible through collective valuation procedures — e.g., 
voting over critical decisions that influence royalty sharing, such as 
the choice to include a new patent and the amount of royalties a new 
patent would command.
231
 This study examined whether this Theory 
of Collective Patent Valuation accurately describes the design of any 
patent pools in practice. 
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This study’s most important finding is that most patent pools have 
not been designed as forums for collective patent valuation. For in-
stance, the twenty “ex ante bargain” patent pools were not even de-
signed to incorporate new patent rights over time.
232
 Instead, all of 
these groups pertained exclusively to patents in existence at the time 
of group formation.
233
 Likewise, the nine royalty-free patent pools 
identified in this study were limited to patents or to well-defined tech-
nologies in existence at the time of pool formation.
234
 These limita-
tions reflect the fact that many patent pools have not been designed to 
encourage innovation, but rather, to facilitate the licensing of existing 
technologies. 
Those patent pools that were designed to incorporate new patents 
over time seldom offered inventors any influence over their royalties. 
In the fifteen share-based patent pools, patents were exchanged for 
stock that periodically yielded dividends.235 The bylaws of these cor-
porations show that their founders contemplated including new patent 
rights over time.
236
 However, the decisions that affected patent valua-
tion — e.g., whether to acquire a new patent and how many shares of 
stock its owner should receive — were not made collectively by 
shareholders.
237
 Thus, like ex ante bargains and royalty-free pools, 
share-based patent pools do not support the Theory of Collective Pa-
tent Valuation. 
Ultimately, only two organizations supported the Theory of Col-
lective Patent Valuation: the MAA and the 1935 patent pool com-
posed of oil companies.
238
 Because these organizations were built to 
acquire more patents over time, and because they permitted patent 
holders to elect the representatives who influenced the division of 
royalties, they satisfy the Theory’s requirements.
239
  
But perhaps the Theory of Collective Patent Valuation need not 
apply in order to get the desired benefits of reduced transaction costs, 
lowered holdout risk, and increased innovation incentives. Indeed, 
formula-based patent pools offer an important alternative to pools that 
meet the Theory’s requirements: “Rough-and-ready” rent-sharing 
rules even appear to be preferable to collective patent valuation pro-
cedures in some situations. Because such rules may be just as likely to 
over-compensate patent holders as they are to under-compensate 
them, they may provide a fair aggregate return after repeated interac-
                                                                                                                  
232. Supra Part III.A. 
233. Id. 
234. See, e.g., AMA, supra note 199; OIN, supra note 217 (limiting OIN to software pa-
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tions. Moreover, these rules are simple to administer and appear to 
require less coordination than a more complex voting procedure 
would require. Although these rules may encourage some companies 
to innovate, enthusiasm for this approach should be tempered: The 
companies most likely to profit from this “game” are those that own 
enough patents to participate multiple times. 
A second alternative approach yields important cost savings 
without even attempting to collectively value patents. Many patent 
pools are structured to provide their members with access to valuable 
pools of patents and knowhow as well as access to after-acquired pa-
tent rights of licensees. Many also provide patent contributors access 
to joint funds designed to offset the costs of enforcing or defending 
patent rights, and to help pay for prosecuting new patent applications. 
It appears that the benefits of joining some patent pools relate more to 
savings than to compensation. 
The foregoing observations can be reduced to a digestible set of 
insights: There is little support for the Theory of Collective Patent 
Valuation. To the contrary, many patent pooling agreements are not 
designed to include new patent rights over time. Most of those that 
are capable of including new patents over time do not offer their 
members any power to influence the royalties they collect. In lieu of 
collective valuation procedures, an increasing number of such patent 
pools are turning to rough-and-ready royalty-sharing rules that appear 
to benefit repeat players. Thus, some patent pools may indeed be ca-
pable of encouraging innovation, but the incentive is likely only 
strong for companies that have enough patents to play the game mul-
tiple times. Smaller patent holders may still be drawn to patent pools 
for benefits unrelated to compensation, however, such as access to 
shared patent rights and litigation funds. 
These conclusions do not disprove the theory that patent pools 
encourage innovation. However, they do show that the role of collec-
tive behavior in our patent system is far more complex than theorists 
have predicted. The link between institutional design and innovation 
has long been unappreciated, in large part, because patent pooling 
agreements are not visible to policymakers or to the public. 
B. A Proposal for the Recording of Patent Pooling Agreements 
This Article’s findings show that private institutions have long 
had a significant and largely unappreciated impact on innovation in-
centives and returns. However, as explained in Part II, policy efforts 
to reform the patent system have generally focused on the institutions 
that define it — namely, the PTO and the Federal Circuit. In order to 
better encourage innovation, future patent reform efforts should be 
informed by the role of private institutions. To that end, I propose that 
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Congress enact legislation that would mandate (or alternatively, en-
courage) the recording of patent pooling agreements with a federal 
agency. 
Patent pools are changing the rules of innovation. Our patent sys-
tem is premised on the theory that innovation is encouraged by offer-
ing inventors limited monopoly pricing power.
240
 However, this study 
has shown that patent holders are increasingly ceding this power — 
sometimes in whole and sometimes just in part — to gain membership 
to private licensing communities.241 In some industries, joining such 
groups may be a necessary prerequisite to providing certain services 
or products.242 Consequently, the incentive to innovate is increasingly 
defined by private rules. 
Because collective patent agreements are usually private, the im-
pact of collective action on innovation has been poorly understood. As 
this study has shown, the realities of collective governance are far 
more varied and complex than theorists have appreciated. Some pa-
tent pools are focused on lowering the cost of producing existing 
products.
243
 Others hold no promise of royalties but deliver important 
cost savings.
244
 Some patent pools may be capable of encouraging 
innovation, but through rough-and-ready rules rather than carefully-
tuned voting regimes.245 These insights come only from records that 
could be located; the true number of patent licensing collectives that 
have existed in the past is unknown, as are the full number and nature 
of any such groups that operate in secrecy today. It is striking how 
much will remain unknown about the internal governance of these 
organizations in the future if the historical lack of public reporting 
continues. 
A new law designed to encourage the recording of collective pa-
tent licenses would be an important first step in redirecting policy ef-
forts; such a law would inform policymakers of the total number of 
patent licensing groups that operate in various industries, and the in-
stitutional forms such groups have adopted. With the benefit of this 
information, policymakers would be better able to understand how 
collective action influences the incentive to innovate. This knowledge 
will be essential to crafting new policies that maximize innovation, 
economic prosperity, and social welfare. 
What would a patent agreement recording law look like? A con-
gressional bill proposed nearly eighty years ago provides a good mod-
el. In January of 1935, H.R. 4523 was introduced in the House of 
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Representatives with the title “A Bill Providing for the Recording of 
Patent Pooling Agreements and Contracts with the Commissioner of 
Patents.”
246
 The core of the bill required the following: 
That every agreement by which rights in a plurality 
of patented inventions are rendered subject to com-
mon ownership, control, or enjoyment, whether by 
assignment, license, or otherwise . . . shall be record-
ed in the Patent Office within six months from the 
date thereof. . . . That any change or addition in the 
parties or patents involved in the agreements record-
ed as hereinbefore provided and any changes in the 
provisions of such agreements shall be fully set forth 
and duly recorded in the Patent Office within three 
months of the date thereof.
247
 
Had this law been enacted, it would have imposed civil penalties 
on any person or organization that failed to comply with its provi-
sions.248 However, the bill did not provide details on how compliance 
would be monitored.
249
 
During the winter and spring of 1935, a special Committee on Pa-
tents investigated the possible usefulness of H.R. 4523 by interview-
ing a wide spectrum of patent holders — from some of the largest 
corporations in the country down to individual inventors.
250
 The 
Committee observed that some patent pooling arrangements are “ben-
eficial . . . to the general public welfare,” while others are used to car-
ry out “secret and sinister [goals] . . . prejudicial to public interest.”
251
 
In its final report, the Committee concluded that “the recordation of 
such agreements in the United States Patent Office, and in the Federal 
Trade Commission would seem to be the best method of preventing 
such secret and sinister operations.”
252
 However, for reasons that are 
unclear from the legislative history the bill never advanced beyond the 
committee stage. 
If introduced today, a bill modeled on H.R. 4523 would solve 
several problems. First, and most importantly, such a law would pro-
vide much-needed information to policymakers. As mentioned earlier, 
patent reform legislation efforts have largely focused on the institu-
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tions that apportion patent rights.
253
 Patent pools, the internal structure 
of which is often unknown, redefine these rights in several respects. If 
policymakers are to make intelligent decisions, it seems they must 
have a clearer understanding of the impact of these private regimes. 
A second positive outcome of this proposal relates to its impact 
on contracting behavior. If such a law made patent pooling contracts 
available to the general public, it could indirectly place public pres-
sure on patent holders to form pools that are forward-looking by de-
sign. By the same token, the new law would also discourage restric-
restrictive pooling agreements that slow the pace of innovation (to the 
extent such pools are not already prohibited by applicable antitrust 
law). 
While the foregoing reasons show why a bill like H.R. 4523 could 
very well gain the necessary political goodwill to be enacted into law, 
large patent holders might oppose a law that mandates the recording 
of private agreements. Thus, a gentler approach may be needed. The 
National Cooperative Research and Production Act (“NCRPA”) — a 
federal law passed in 1984 — provides a model for a more moderate 
approach.254 The law offers reduced antitrust penalties to research 
consortia that inform the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission of 
their operations.
255
 An attorney with the DOJ who commented for this 
Article explained that “although the law does not require consortia to 
file their membership agreements under the Act, many do so in hopes 
of receiving favorable business reviews from the Department of Jus-
tice.”
256
 Thus, the NCRPA encourages the recording of research 
agreements with a carrot rather than a stick. A patent agreement re-
cording law would do well to adopt a similar design. 
Drafters of a patent agreement recording law would have several 
important factors to consider. First, they would need to decide wheth-
er to mandate or merely encourage the recording of collective patent 
agreements. While a mandatory recording law could yield the most 
information, it might also face the greatest opposition from certain 
constituencies. Moreover, a mandatory recording law could spur col-
laborators to search for paths to cooperation that do not involve for-
mal contracts (e.g., non-assertion pledges). This wasted activity would 
represent efficiency losses. For this reason, lawmakers might prefer a 
gentler approach that mirrors the NCRPA’s reductions in antitrust 
penalties in return for compliance. Compliance could also be encour-
aged through novel incentives such as an expedited review of patent 
applications submitted by members of participating organizations. 
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Second, lawmakers would need to decide where recorded agree-
ments should be submitted and who would have access to them. Two 
prime choices are the DOJ and the PTO. The DOJ already reviews 
similar agreements in connection with requests for antitrust business 
review letters and agreements submitted in connection with the 
NCRPA.
257
 Moreover, if the bill proposed here were to offer a reduc-
tion in antitrust penalties, it would fall squarely within the DOJ’s pur-
view. Thus, the DOJ appears to have a strong existing framework for 
receiving and analyzing patent pooling agreements. 
By contrast, the PTO could be a good custodian for different rea-
sons. Unlike the DOJ, the PTO has a long history of receiving, re-
viewing, and storing vast collections of patent-related information.
258
 
From this perspective, it could make sense for the PTO to collect re-
lated patent pooling agreements. The PTO has also long published 
periodic reports on patent application filings and grants.259 A new av-
enue of business for the office could be the publishing of reports on 
the number and nature of patent pooling agreements in operation 
across the country. The PTO’s institutional competency and internal 
resources could thus make it a strong choice for overseeing the collec-
tion of patent pooling agreements. 
The very existence of the NCRPA and H.R. 4523 indicates that 
this proposal could be both useful and achievable. To be sure, like any 
legislative proposal, such a bill would probably face some opposition. 
The most vocal opponents would likely be those with the most to lose: 
companies that perceive strategic advantages in keeping their patent 
pooling operations secret. Moreover, policing and enforcing compli-
ance with such a law could create new administrative costs. However, 
as explained above, a moderate approach that solicits rather than 
mandates the recording of collective patent licenses should quell such 
criticism. At the same time, lawmakers, experts, and many industry 
stakeholders might rally in support of a law that would shed light on 
the transformative but often hidden practice of collective patent li-
censing. 
V. CONCLUSION 
From the outside, many patent pools look remarkably alike: All 
are private organizations whose members own patents that relate to a 
particular field. Most pools offer outsiders access to their patents in 
exchange for royalties. As voluntary organizations, patent pools ap-
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pear to offer benefits that outweigh members’ desires to engage in 
independent and unmediated market transactions. 
In light of the limited information available on the inner workings 
of these groups, it is understandable that legal scholars and policy-
makers have long viewed them as, by and large, alike. This mindset is 
evident in the very fact that commentators continue to use the blanket 
term “patent pool” to describe nearly any cooperative effort involving 
patent holders. Likewise, it is not surprising that theorists have as-
sumed that, like many collective rights organizations, patent pools 
reflect the collective will of their members — specifically with re-
spect to the collective valuation of property rights. This assumption is 
particularly appealing because it offers an elegant solution to the pric-
ing problem that afflicts our patent system. 
This study of such collectives has shown, however, that the reali-
ties of collective patent licensing are far more varied than theory pre-
dicts. Most strikingly, there is little empirical support for the theory 
that patent pools act as forums for collective patent valuation. To the 
contrary, many such groups are not designed to include new patent 
rights over time. Those that are capable of including new patents over 
time generally do not grant their members any voice in royalty shar-
ing. 
Although patent pools seldom offer their members the power to 
influence royalties, some appear to offer an unexpected innovation 
incentive to repeat players. By adopting “rough-and-ready” royalty-
sharing rules that are undemocratic by design, some patent pools offer 
an efficient means of cooperation that does not require cumbersome 
collective valuation procedures such as voting over key group deci-
sions. Although these crude formulas may undervalue some patents, 
they may also overvalue other patents, thus potentially yielding a fair 
return for those patent holders who can afford to participate a suffi-
cient number of times — i.e., those possessing many patents and a 
strong innovation pipeline. Rough-and-ready royalty sharing is in 
widespread use in standards-based patent pools today and appears to 
be growing in popularity as of this writing. 
A second unexpected discovery is that cooperation among patent 
holders may often be motivated more by the promise of savings than 
by a quest for compensation. Such savings are rooted in promises of 
immunity from patent infringement and invalidity suits, as well as 
access to collective funds set aside to defend, enforce, and prosecute 
patent rights. The recent popularity of royalty-free patent licensing 
demonstrates that such benefits can inspire and sustain cooperation on 
their own. 
The foregoing conclusions suggest significant refinements to the-
ory. Importantly, these findings also signal the need for policy 
measures to improve the amount and quality of information available 
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about collective patent licensing. The forces that will cause patent 
licensing collectives to form in the future, the degree of control such 
groups afford their members, and the means by which wealth is 
shared are pressing questions that cannot be easily studied without 
such information. 
The ongoing paucity of information on this subject represents 
more than a roadblock for theorists — it fosters a policy blind spot 
that threatens to frustrate the efforts of lawmakers and regulators more 
and more as patent pools become more prevalent. Private collectives 
are increasingly defining the roles that patents play in our society, but 
policymakers will remain uninformed about their nature and impact 
unless recording requirements make them visible.  
A new patent agreement recording law designed to encourage the 
filing of collective patent licenses with a federal agency such as the 
PTO or the DOJ is a promising solution to this problem. Although this 
plan might face some opposition, there is reason to believe that Con-
gress would approve it today just as the Committee of Patents did 
when the proposal was last investigated in the 1930s. This solution 
would be an effective, achievable, and relatively inexpensive way to 
shed light on collective patent licensing — a phenomenon that is 
powerfully and silently defining the future of innovation. 
APPENDIX 
Table 1: Patent Licensing Collectives Examined 
Year Subject Matter Profit Allocation 
1856 Sewing Machines fixed sums 
1866 Steel-Making (Bessemer Process) fixed percentages 
1877 Steel-Making (Bessemer Process) corporate shares 
1890 Steel-Making (Bessemer Process) corporate shares 
1890 Farming Tools corporate shares 
1895 Pneumatic Straw Stackers fixed sums 
1899 Footwear corporate shares 
1899 Bathtubs fixed sums 
1900 Seeded Raisins fixed percentages 
1907 Automobiles royalty-free 
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Year Subject Matter Profit Allocation 
1909 Liquid Door Checks fixed percentages 
1913 Bicycle and Motorcycle Brakes fixed sums 
1916 Beds fixed percentages 
1916 Automobile Bumpers fixed percentages 
1917 Aircraft expert valuations 
1919 Radio corporate shares 
1921 Oil Refining (Cracking Process) fixed percentages 
1924 Flat Glass fixed percentages 
1926 Peach Pitting corporate shares 
1929 Coated Abrasives corporate shares 
1930 Water Conditioning corporate shares 
1931 Rail Joint Bars fixed percentages 
1933 Oil Refining (Gray Process) fixed percentages 
1933 Oil Refining (HC Technique) expert valuation 
1933 Hydraulic Oil Pumps fixed percentages 
1933 Machine Tools corporate shares 
1934 Lecithin Production corporate shares 
1934 Variable Condensers fixed percentages 
1934 Color Cinematography royalty-free 
1935 Petroleum Refining corporate shares 
1935 Plexigum fixed percentages 
1938 Pour Depressants fixed percentages 
1938 Fuse Cutouts fixed percentages 
1938 Furniture Slipcovers fixed percentages 
1943 Air Conditioning corporate shares 
1949  Elastic Stockings fixed percentages 
1952 Wrinkle Finishes corporate shares 
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Year Subject Profit Allocation 
1955 Women’s Hosiery corporate shares 
1956 Fiberglass corporate shares 
1997 MPEG-2 Video Formula 
1997 Wireless Data (Bluetooth) royalty-free 
1998 Digital Video Discs (DVD) Formula 
1999 Gene Fragments royalty-free 
1999 Data Transfer (IEEE 1394) Formula 
2001 Mobile Communications (3G) Formula 
2004 Digital Video (H.264) Formula 
2005 Linux Operating System royalty-free 
2008 CleanTech royalty-free 
2008 Wireless Data (RFID) Formula 
2010 CleanTech royalty-free 
2010 HIV royalty-free 
2012 Neglected Tropical Diseases royalty-free 
  
 
